Hopes of imminent defeat of regime may be optimistic but resistance is making gains

Amitav Acharya

Nikkei Asia, January 9, 2025,

When Myanmar’s military under Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing seized power on Feb. 1, 2021, abruptly ending the country’s decade-long democratic experiment, no one expected a quick resolution to the ensuing conflict and humanitarian disaster. But the fallout — including death, destruction and economic damage –has exceeded even the worst fears. Will 2025 be any different?

The regime has been fighting various armed resistance groups. These have included ethnic armed organizations, consisting of minority groups that have been fighting for autonomy since the country’s independence in 1948; the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) that were  et up in  opposition to the military takeover in 2021 under the banner of the rebel National Unity Government; and local defense forces (LDF) that were also established in 2021 by activists. In October 2023, there was a dramatic turn in the conflict when a coordinated offensive by three opposition armed groups, comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army, launched an offensive campaign known as Operation 1027 after the date it started. The so-called Three Brotherhood Alliance inflicted significant losses on the military. This led to hopes that the stalemate on the battlefield had been broken, with the advantage shifting decisively to the armed opposition groups seeking to oust the regime.

While Myanmar is no stranger to internal strife, this is the first time that the Burmese military is fighting not only ethnic groups, but also armed pro- democracy groups among the Bamar majority in the country’s heartlands. The proliferation of resistance groups has also led to unprecedented levels of cooperation. The crisis monitoring group, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), estimates that the PDF and LDF have captured some 80 towns and 200 military bases across Myanmar.

But hopes that the victories of the opposition would lead to a quick and total defeat of the military have proven too optimistic. Part of the reason is that those areas where the opposition scored its most sensational victories were particularly favorable to them, but they constituted only a small — if significant — part of the conflict areas. While the loss of some border posts might underscore the regime’s vulnerabilities, they did not prove decisive.

The opposition groups are also plagued by infighting. While they often display substantial cooperation, there are also plenty of military clashes. Ironically, victory on the ground has exacerbated tensions among the opposition units as they compete for territory and administrative control over areas seized from the military. ACLED recorded more than 300 cases of such armed clashes in 2024.

China has played a crucial role in limiting the regime’s losses. Closing border posts to Kachin and northern Shan state rebels, it has put pressure on them to strike a ceasefire with the regime. While China’s primary motive is to ensure security along its border with Myanmar, the result of its actions is to give the generals some breathing space.

The regime has also benefited from diplomatic intervention by Thailand, which stepped up efforts in late December to find a political settlement. Bangkok last year hosted the first of “informal consultations” between Myanmar’s military and representatives from neighboring countries: China, India, Bangladesh, Laos and Thailand. It has also been holding meetings with other ASEAN members on a ministerial level.

Thailand’s move is not surprising. Bangkok had already shown impatience with ASEAN’s muddled approach that had been marred by giving Laos, which just finished its one-year term as ASEAN chair and handed over to Malaysia, the exclusive prerogative in appointing ASEAN’s chief interlocutor with the Myanmar regime. In addition, the Thai military enjoys a special relationship with the Myanmar military.

Sharing a 2,400-kilometer border with Myanmar and hosting hundreds of thousands of Myanmar refugees in border regions and many more inside Thailand, Bangkok can claim to have a special interest in seeking a quick resolution of the Myanmar conflict.

Thailand played a similar role in ending the Cambodia conflict in the 1980s. But there are notable differences this time. While the earlier efforts involved all the warring Cambodian factions, the NUG, Myanmar’s government-in-exile, has not yet been invited to the Thai-led informal consultations. It is not clear if and when the NUG will participate in these talks.

Whatever its motive, the Thai initiative is viewed as providing a lifeline to Min Aung Hlaing, who has faced battlefield defeats, defections from his forces and internal dissension. His battered regime faced another major setback in late December, when the Arakan Army, a member of the Brotherhood Alliance, captured the headquarters of the military’s western military command center in Rakhine state, a humiliating defeat and the second such command to fall after the Alliance’s capture of the northeast command headquarters in Lashio in August 2024.

The regime promised elections soon after it seized power in 2021. But it has delayed conducting them, citing instability in parts of the country. China is applying pressure for them to be held. The election issue was understood to have featured in discussions when Min Aung Hlaing made his first visit to China in early November.

Myanmar’s foreign minister has reportedly suggested that officials from neighboring countries would be invited to observe elections when they take place. But there is much skepticism that the regime would hold free, fair and inclusive elections. The NUG almost certainly will not attempt to participate as it is now an outlawed group and might urge people to boycott the elections under conditions that it deems unfair.

The NUG has scrapped the 2008 constitution that allowed the military to occupy 25% of parliamentary seats. Drafting a new constitution to eliminate or reduce the military’s privileges will take time and may be politically impossible. There is always the danger that fighting could severely disrupt the electoral process unless all sides in the Myanmar conflict agree to any new arrangement.

The success of the Thai approach and a diplomatic solution will also depend on how other ASEAN members respond to it. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singaporehave shown a deep distrust of Myanmar’s regime. But this might change as ASEAN member states feel more desire to move on from Myanmar issues. Malaysia, as ASEAN chair in 2025, will have an especially critical role. While Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has been fiercely critical of the Naypyidaw regime, he once advocated for “constructive intervention” with Malaysia’s then- military rulers in the 1990s when he was Malaysia’s deputy prime minister. Western nations would reject any election that did not involve the NUG and the other major opposition parties. But even a rigged election could help the regime gain legitimacy as long as ASEAN members and other regional powers such as China and India accept the result.

The West, distracted by conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, might pass the buck to ASEAN to solve the Myanmar issue. Although ASEAN so far has failed to make much diplomatic headway in ending the conflict, the Thai-led initiative might give a new opening to ASEAN in addressing the Myanmar crisis. But time is running out as Myanmar’s economy is close to collapse. With half the country’s townships affected by the fighting and millions of people displaced, poverty levels have doubled since 2021. A string of natural disasters, including two major typhoons in 2023 and 2024, have delayed a recovery from the COVID pandemic.

According to the World Bank, Myanmar’s economy is expected to contract by 1%, in the fiscal year ending March 2025. With a third of the population in dire need of humanitarian assistance, it warned of severe long term consequences, including “the risk of a lost generation.”

The coming year could be a decisive one in Myanmar’s political situation and might determine whether an end to the fighting is possible or whether the country is condemned to permanent Balkanization.

(https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Can-Myanmar-turn-the-corner-in-2025)