Interview with Dr Roeslan Abdulghani, Secretary General, Asia-Africa Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, 1955

The video of the interview is available at:

Transcript: Interview with Roeslan Abdulgani

Former Foreign Minister of Indonesia and Secretary-General of the Bandung Conference

Interview conducted by: Professor Amitav Acharya

April 25, 2002

Preface to Interview with Dr Roselan Abdulghani (Amitav Acharya)

Most students of Asian politics and international relations have heard about the Asia-Africa Conference held in the Indonesian town of Bandung between 18 and 24 April 1955. Attended by 29 nations, the conference discussed cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa, their social, economic and cultural problems, problems affecting national sovereignty, racialism and colonialism, and the contribution of Asian and African countries to world peace and cooperation.

The Secretary-General of this historic conference was Dr Roselan Abdulghani. At the time of the conference, he was the secretary-general of the Indonesia Foreign Ministry. Later, he became President Sukarno’s Foreign Minister, and the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN.

On April 22, 2004, I had the privilege of interviewing him in Jakarta. Dr Roselan was 88 years old, frail, but in good mind and spirit. Our conversation lasted for an hour. During the interview, I had the opportunity to seek his reflections on several aspects of the conference:

  1. Why did Indonesia organize this conference?
  2. What were the main issues discussed and debated at the conference?
  3. How effective were the procedures adopted at the conference?
  4. What was his impressions of some of the key leaders at the conference, such as Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Chou En-Lai of China? And
  5. What is the main legacy of the Bandung Conference?

In the interview that follows, Dr Roselan provides clear and insightful answers to these questions. What comes through here is one of the finest diplomatic histories of that time by one of the most distinguished and ablest diplomats the developing world has ever produced.

AA: Tell me why Indonesia decided to organize the Bandung Conference.

RA: Well, as you know, in 1953, 1954, we faced the danger of the Vietnam War spreading to Southeast Asia. We felt that there was a danger. Secondly, we were fighting, at that time, against Dutch colonialism about West Irian. And that was a tough struggle, and we were of the opinion that colonialism was an international problem. So to fight off colonialism, we should also fight on an international level. That means that the Asian-African countries, who were at that time still colonized, should be mobilized. Thirdly, we wanted an economic cooperation between these countries who were not yet technically developed. And lastly, there was President Sukarno’s dream in 1930, 1932, during the colonial period. He said that the benteng of Indonesia, the bullof Indonesia, should cooperate with the lembu mandi of India, with the barong, the dragon of China, with the tiger of Philippines, also with the white elephant of Thailand. And if we all cooperated in fighting against colonialism, then we would win. Therefore, his idea of having a Conference of Asia and Africa was motivated by the situation at the time, but also by the dream he had in 1930.

For the Colombo Conference between the five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Burma and Indonesia), we had the idea that we would like to invite China, and so, this was discussed. Not only China, but also the other countries that were more or less involved in the Cold War. Because we knew that between the Colombo powers at that time, there was the problem of Pakistan and India. Pakistan was a member of a military alliance, while India rejected military alliances – we knew that. When the Bandung Conference was opened, 29 countries were there. So you have endless ranks of the 29 countries.

You have countries who are members of a military alliance, and also countries who are neutral, which means non-aligned. This posed a problem because in one of the resolutions we talked about the right of defence, and it required very tough bargaining to come to a balanced decision, especially in terms of the wording. Later on, the right of self-defence, singly or collectively, was recognized. This had consequences for countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, and other countries who were members of NATO or SEATO. We recognized that they had the right of self-defence collectively, but we would prefer that they had the right of defence individually as well. The verdict on the right defence, singly or collectively, is recognized, but there should be an abstention from the use of military alliances to serve the particular interests of the great powers.

There was a big debate. Nehru, Indonesia, and all the countries who were against the military alliances, said: “Alright, you have the right of self-defence collectively. But you should abstain to use that military alliance for the special interests of big powers.” Pakistan could not say that they were serving the interests of the big power, because Pakistan said “No, if we are a member of SEATO, we are after our own security.” So that was a compromise. And that was one of the delicate problems at the Conference which was solved.

That would also solve the problem of Communism. Because we invited China, and China is Communist. Moreover, China is considered to be an annex of Moscow. In Bandung, there were other opinions, especially from Nehru, but also from Indonesia, and from Zhou Enlai himself. Zhou Enlai said, “Look, we are Communists. I am Communist. But this does not mean that we follow everything that Mao Zedong says.” And that’s how the idea came that Chinese Communism is different from Moscow Communism. So when Sir John Kotelawala presented the idea that there is a new form of colonialism, and the relationship between Moscow and East Europe, we said: “No that is not colonialism, that is up to them.”

Therefore, the meeting about this problem of colonialism, and all its new forms, ended with a compromise. And the compromise was this. We are going say that there was a very antagonistic debate about colonialism in all its forms, because the idea of Sir John Kotelawala was that Communism was colonialism in another form. This was rejected by Zhou Enlai, and also by the other people. No, you cannot say that communism is colonialism. But how could we solve this problem?

We agreed not to mix up the problem, and interfere in the relations between Moscow and the Eastern countries. That was up to them. We don’t want to be mixed up in that. And then, said Zhou Enlai, “If you would like to have colonialism in all its manifestations, then I agree. And he used his hands, like this, showing the Conference. This is colonialism, and its manifestation is in the political field, in the economic field, in the social field, in the ideological field, and so on. But this is manifestation. If you change colonialism in all its manifestations, it is an evil that should be brought to an end. Then I agree.”

So this delicate problem was compromised. Everybody knows that we were treating very delicate problems. That was the success of the Bandung Conference – to eliminate sharp conflicts of ideas, and to come to compromises. This was possible because the rules of procedure made it possible. There are no fixed rules of procedures. It is up to the Chairman to conduct the procedure, the debate, on a very wise way. And that is avoiding floating. How will you come to a decision? By consensus, which is a very interesting problem. I think in Indonesian society, we used four things: discussion (mushawarah), and then we come to mufakat, which means consensus. So if you have two different opinions, you cut off the sharp points of both, and you come to a compromise.

Therefore, the final Communiqué of the Bandung Conference, actually is full of compromises. But without compromises, how can you come to an agreement between twenty-nine countries, which was nearly half of the world, at that time where the United Nations consisted of sixty members. And twenty-nine countries were in Bandung.

AA: Do you think this idea of consensus was Indonesia’s idea? From Indonesian village culture? You also thought this was the most practical way.

RA: We suggested that.

AA: You suggested that? Indonesia suggested?

RA: We know that the other countries, such as the Islamic Arab countries, also agreed that it should come to consensus. Because in the Qu’ranic verse it is said that you should always come to an agreement. Of course you have different opinions, but if you have different opinions, you should try to persuade the other with reasoning, by being very kind, and patient, but also think of the time. That is what the Qu’ran said. You cannot talk for months. So we said: “Of course we should think of the time. And therefore you should come to a consensus because the situation was dangerous at the time. The situation of the Cold War.

The Bandung Conference affected the whole world. From Southeast Asia spreading to the Middle East. That is what I think is the greatest achievement of the Bandung Conference. And the idea that the world is not divided into two blocs. Why should the world be defined by a liberal democracy with capitalism on the one hand, and on the other, an authoritarian Communism with an altruistic ideology. Why should that be the world? No. We said no. There is a Third World.

The idea of a Third World actually came up at the Bandung Conference. The rest is divided into Moscow and Washington. Both had the glory that was Rome, the glory that was Greece, the glory that was Christianity. We, what you call the East, we had the cradle of religions, the cradle of philosophies, the cradles of life – Mesopotamia, the Ganges, the Indus in India, and then you have the Nile. And that is non-Western. So why should we submit to the idea that the world is divided in only these two blocs, and that there is no alternative. You must choose, or you are off the radar. No, we will not choose. We will choose for ourselves. And that is the idea, that we nurtured in the Bandung Conference, and later on it was materialized in the Non-bloc movement.

AA: Can you tell me about the role of China, and especially Prime Minister Zhou Enlai?

RA: It is very interesting, because at first we thought that Zhou Enlai would be a hardliner. Because he was a Communist, and he admitted in his speech that “I am atheist.” We were all frightened, but we didn’t expect his openness. He said: “Why I am an atheist? We, Chinese Communists, respect religion. And we don’t want to have a religion war. And we are not against religion, but religion should be fighting against colonialism. Because religion should be fighting against colonialism, because colonialism is against the religion and against the other communisms. That was revealing of the man. This man is very tolerant. And then he said, “Don’t worry about me. I am an atheist. But that doesn’t mean that I do not recognize, and respect others. In my delegation, there are Muslims. And there were.

This is what we mean by peaceful co-existence. We may differ, but we have a          peaceful co-existence. We will not quarrel over this problem, because we are facing colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and so on. This is what Zhou Enlai revealed to us. This actually was not new, because Nehru also had this idea. But this came from the man we thought was a hardliner. And this was revealing.

In his role, he was very, very cooperative. He listened to the speech of Sir John Kotelawala. And then in the mid-afternoon he stopped and said: “Sir John Kotelawala, are you expecting me to fight against you? No!” John was amazed. “Look, I would like to see your text. I will reply tomorrow. But I am not here to quarrel with you. I am here to come to a peaceful settlement of our ideas.” And that is what the whole conference respected, this attitude of Zhou Enlai.

The next morning he made a very short speech. He said, “ I have listened, and I have disagreed, but I have talked to Sir John Kotelawala about it.” And later on, John Kotelawala said that he did not mean Chinese Communism when he spoke.

A very positive role, and very constructive role.

Another thing was that he was adamant. He did not want to recognize Formosa. He is a man of the One-China policy. And he knows the second fleet of the American army is around there. He said, “No, we cannot accept two Chinas.” That is his only stubborn, if I may use the word, attitude.

AA: There was a compromise on the question of military pacts and also on the question of colonialism. Do you think that compromise, that military pacts collectively or singly is OK, but should not be used for the interests of a superpower. That formula, or that compromise, did it have an impact on SEATO later? That it got the Asian countries to think that military alliances are not good.

RA: Of course, we know what will be the attitude of these two big powers. But we said to them that this is our position, if there is a Cold War problem. Because one of the purposes of the Asian-Africa Conference was to feel the professions of Asia and Africa in the World today. That was one of the purposes. We feel our professions in the Cold War. If there is a problem of Cold War in Korea, in Vietnam, in Berlin, our profession is mediation. We try to mediate. We do not use nuclear weapons. We do not use force. If it comes to colonialism, then we fight against it. If America supports colonialism, we will fight America. And if the Soviet Union supports colonialism in Eastern Europe, then we may fight them. But when it comes to the problem of Cold War, we will mediate. That was clear. These two big powers began to think about it.

AA: How about the question of sovereignty, and the principle of non-interference, non-intervention of states? Was there a lot of discussion?

RA: Oh yes. That was also discussed. We rejected any intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. But of course the big problem is economic, because we were all from the Third World. We urged an oil-policy, because we know that we need countries that have oil in Middle East, and here as well. The idea of having an oil-producing organization, like OPEC, was conceived in the Bandung Conference.

AA: Question about Nehru’s role.

RA: Prime Minister Nehru had a very, very leading role. Not only because he has such great charisma, but he is considered the man who is the forerunner of the freedom movement, in India and so on. He mastered the English language, he mastered politics, and he knew all the tactics and strategies of the Great Britain colonial policy. And that is reflected in his ideas when he is talking about this. So his role is a very leading one. That is what I can say. He is a state senior. Of course, he was always criticized by Mohammad Ali. But that does not make any sense, because we know that they were brothers who fought, so we tried to mediate between them.

The problem of the impact of the Bandung Conference, was the non-Aligned Conference. They had a membership that started at 24, later it was 50, showing the relevance of the Bandung Conference. If you ask me whether the ideas at Bandung are still relevant today, mostly they are. But we should also understand the changes of the world. Not all it is still useful. But the basic things, about peaceful co-existence are still valid. Now the people say that the Cold War is over, but there is new war coming. That is the war between the developed countries and the countries that are underdeveloped. This should be bridged. That is why we addressed the debt problem, the problem of technology. The peaceful co-existence idea, I think, is still relevant today.

What we see today, the problem of Zionism against the Arab, Islamic World, and the Third World. Zionism also has its roots in America. It is different from anti-Semitism. If you ask me how to solve this, I believe that you can still use some of the ideas from Bandung.

AA: Did it have an impact on ASEAN. Later on, when Southeast Asian countries led by Indonesia, decided to have their own regional organization, ASEAN. Did Bandung – the process, the principles – have any impact on Indonesia’s involvement in ASEAN?

RA: I think ASEAN has its history. ASEAN has its contribution to the problem of stability in Southeast Asia. But later on, it becomes too limited. So ASEAN must expand its membership, and therefore you now have APEC., the problem of new regional cooperation. I understand that the original ASEAN members would like to keep the ASEAN idea. But you cannot keep it limited.

AA: But what I was asking you also is that ASEAN also operates on the basis of consensus. And ASEAN is also trying to develop, in the 1950s and 60s, a policy of neutralization of Southeast Asia. Do you that some ideas of Bandung had an impact on Indonesian foreign policy, and in the foreign ministry. And when Indonesia became a member of ASEAN, it was trying to make ASEAN in the same mold as the Bandung principles of consensus.

RA: That is true, but it depends on the cabinet in Indonesia, whether it was intensive enough, or just superficial. So we had times were the cabinet in Indonesia was only superficially doing it. But there are times where we are going to be intensive.

Look at the period of Suharto. Suharto is committed to ASEAN. Because ASEAN, at birth, was to keep peace in this area, and not to be a communist organization. But later on, it could not control the influence of China. But China also changed. In the later period, Suharto went to China. Then you have the Habibie period, but it was too short to say what it was. Then came Gus Dur who tried to intensify ASEAN. And now Megawati, I don’t know. The new foreign Minister talks to me as a senior person, and his staff also. I ask him what he is doing: “You cannot keep ASEAN the way that it was. You have to move on. The world is moving, so you need a larger regional cooperation.

In this respect, we were also very clear with Zhou Enlai. Do not interfere anymore. Do not interfere in other states. That is what we told Zhou Enlai. Because colonialism is not only a monopoly of the West, but also exists in the East. He understood. He later on invited me to go to Ulan Baator, in Outer Mongolia.

AA During the Bandung Conference, Nehru said that if you join a military pact, you degrade yourself. The countries that join military alliances are not very sovereign countries. Is there a sense that if countries like Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, and Philippines join military alliances with the US, and use the alliance against other countries in Asia, that means they are not acting as sovereign states?

RA: That’s true, which is why we acted to protect the right of self-defence collectively, that you should abstain from the use of collective military arrangements for the specific interest of the people. Of course, this is just a formulation to caution them. Don’t be used by America as a weapon against other countries. You can see from the “Ten Principles of Bandung” that the right of self-defence singly or collectively is recognized. But you should abstain the use of collective military alliances for the specific interest of the big power.

Hinduism and Buddhism are the so called hydraulic civilizations. They are of the rivers, big rivers. The Rhine is also big, but there are no civilizations.

AA: I think it is interesting to see that you are recognized as one of the key players in the development of non-alignment and Afro-Asian cooperation. And I’m very glad that you are still able to participate in many of these functions. It is a real privilege to meet you.

RA: Professor Amitav, this should give us new inspiration and some confidence that Asia can compete with the rest.

AA: That concludes my interview with Dr. Roeslan Abdulgani, who was, in 1955, the Secretary-General of the Bandung Conference. This is in Jakarta at 11:30 am.

A “Third Way” for World Order After COVID-19

The pandemic will accelerate the development of a “multiplex” world

by Amitav Acharya July 21, 2021

In responding to COVID-19, nations—large and small, democratic and authoritarian—have predictably behaved in similar ways. They have put sovereignty, borders, and their national interests ahead of international cooperation. This phenomenon proved prominent for the United States and China, the two strongest powers, and with small nations, such as Singapore and New Zealand.

Of course, the U.S. and Chinese responses to the pandemic have raised more questions about how the actions of these two countries might affect world order. Contrary to conventional thinking, Chinese and American behavior during the pandemic is not producing a new Cold War or a resurrected liberal international order. Instead, the pandemic is most likely to shift many countries to pursue a different kind of world order—one that reflects multiple centers of authority and capacity in global governance.

The pandemic is most likely to shift many countries to pursue a different kind of world order—one that reflects multiple centers of authority

Different National Responses

The U.S. and Chinese responses to COVID-19 pursued geopolitical goals but with divergent approaches that produced different outcomes. According to Johns Hopkins University, as of July 7, 2021, the United States lost 606,121 lives out of 33,758,758 million cases. China reported 4,848 deaths and 103,948 cases. Even with doubts about its official COVID-19 statistics, China protected its people better than the United States protected the American people. But, for the rest of the world, the more pressing question was whether China, as the country that experienced the first outbreak, and the United States, as a long-standing leader in global health, did enough to protect people in other nations.

The United States and China responded to COVID-19 in very different ways internationally. Under President Donald J. Trump, the United States embraced an “America First” ideology and shunned international cooperation. By contrast, China pursued an activist foreign policy. As President Trump denounced globalization, supply chains, and the World Health Organization (WHO), President Jinping Xi defended globalization and doubled down on Chinese support for, and leadership claims on, global governance. While the United States shopped the world for masks and ventilators, China launched ambitious global mask and vaccine diplomacy efforts.

Chinese President Xi Jinping waves next to Premier Li Keqiang and former president Hu Jintao at the 100th founding anniversary of the Communist Party of China, in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, China on July 1, 2021.

Similar World Order Implications

Yet, more than a year after WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic, where is the global standing of these two powers? The pandemic has undercut China’s influence, especially in Asia. This region is critical because it is not only the fastest growing part of the world economically but also the primary geopolitical center of gravity that holds the key to China’s rise as a great power. John Mearsheimer asserted in the Tragedy of Great Power Politics that a regional sphere of influence is a necessary “stepping stone” for rising powers. In the End of American World Order, I argued that the key to a rising power’s global leadership and influence is gaining its own region’s trust rather than securing influence through coercion, as Mearsheimer implied. In Asia, Beijing’s “trust deficit” increased to 63 percent during 2020 compared with 60.4 percent before the pandemic, measured by the percentage of respondents who had “little confidence” and “no confidence” in China doing “the right thing in the interests of the global community.”

The United States and China responded to COVID-19 in very different ways internationally

Nor did China’s successful domestic response establish the supremacy of the “China model” of governance. China is not the only nation to have handled COVID-19 well. Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore also responded effectively, despite different political systems. To be sure, the pandemic response has made Australia look more like China than Great Britain, but China has not made Singapore—itself critical of Western-style, liberal democracy—seethe with jealousy. As Bilahari Kaushikan, a former official of Singapore’s Foreign Ministry, said: “Beijing first bungled by trying to cover up, allowing the virus to take hold in China and rapidly spread beyond its borders. But the draconian measures only a Leninist system is capable of taking brought it under control, albeit at great cost, not all of which was borne by China.”

No matter how strongly China has complained, people around the world continue to associate the origins of COVID-19 with China. International media have highlighted China’s denials, repression of Chinese citizens for their early warnings, and doubts about Beijing’s transparency and cooperation with WHO, which delayed WHO missions to China and undercut the findings of those missions.  

In the United States, the Trump administration “chose not to provide leadership during a global crisis,” as Thomas Wright put it, and failed to respond effectively to the pandemic at home. The absurdity of President Trump and his loyalists rejecting mask mandates and social distancing in the name of “freedom” became a caricature of American values before the global audience. 

A person walks past the art installation "IN AMERICA How Could This Happen..." by artist Suzanne Brennan Firstenberg, as the spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) continues, on the DC Armory Parade Ground, in Washington D.C., U.S., October 23, 2020.

President Biden has made efforts to restore U.S. credibility and influence abroad. The administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance wants the United States to “lead and sustain a stable and open international system” that features “strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, and rules.” Pundits will recognize these objectives as elements of the liberal international order. The United States’ success in developing vaccines, the Biden administration’s impressive domestic vaccine campaign, and the administration’s vaccine-sharing initiatives bolster U.S. efforts to rejuvenate its vision of a liberal international order.  

Yet, the toxic partisanship of U.S. domestic politics dampens cheer and hope. Trump’s rejection of the result of the 2020 presidential election, attempts to overturn it through lies and coercion—including the January 6 insurrection—and the prospect of Trump returning to power undermine international respect for the United States. In these circumstances, the Biden administration’s revival of the U.S. commitment to multilateralism and cooperation will not restore a U.S.- or Western-dominated world order. The United States faces a long and daunting challenge in restoring faith in its global leadership. 

The Pandemic and the Emerging Multiplex World 

In short, COVID-19 makes neither the United States nor China appealing to the rest of the world. A sizeable number of countries could, with good reason, take a Shakespearean “plague on both your houses” approach to world order in the wake of the pandemic. A similar thing happened during the Cold War, when many countries rejected both superpower blocs and worked to create alternative forms and mechanisms of international cooperation. Such a “third way” is possible now.

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden (L) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping ® inside the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China on December 4, 2013.  REUTERS/Lintao Zhang/Pool

As I have argued elsewhere, international relations before the pandemic exhibited characteristics of “multiplexity”  that neither balance-of-power frameworks (e.g., bipolarity, multipolarity) nor the Western-led liberal international order captured. The emerging “multiplex world” is “not a singular global order, liberal or otherwise, but a complex of crosscutting, if not competing, international orders and globalisms.” In governance terms, a multiplex world is “a G-Plus world, featuring established and emerging powers, global and regional institutions and actors, states, social movements, corporations, private foundations, and various kinds of partnerships among them.”

Rather than locking the world into a new bipolar structure or resurrecting the liberal international order, the pandemic will accelerate the development of this multiplex world. Recovery from the devastation wrought by COVID-19 requires G-Plus governance and cooperation because neither geopolitics nor U.S. global leadership can manage multiplexity effectively. The failures of China and the United States during the pandemic underscore the need to explore and facilitate alternative configurations of governance authority and capacity in the post-pandemic world order. This imperative requires looking past conventional wisdom about the U.S.-China rivalry and the rhetoric about “America is Back” to find new ideas and possibilities, especially those percolating in the Global South.

This essay first appeared in the Think Global Health series, Council on Foreign Relations.

President Biden’s Foreign Policy Challenge: Revive World Order and Restore America’s Image

Biden can reverse a good deal of the loss of US prestige and influence during the Trump era with renewed commitment to global cooperation and multilateralism, and policies such as ending Trump’s anti-immigration stance, including the travel ban on visitors from several Muslim nations.”

Amitav Acharya

[Washington, DC] There is little question that the Biden administration will focus first and foremost on domestic challenges, especially the economic downturn and the COVID-19 pandemic. But four years of Trump have also severely damaged US standing and credibility globally. In particular, the Trump years severely undercut US credibility and prestige around the world and damaged world order, or what pundits call the liberal international order, which was created and led by the US since World War II.

Sand sculpture by renowned artist Sudarsan Patnaik @sudarsansand
on Puri beach, Odisha, India. Source:

The Liberal International Order was founded on a combination of globalization, including free trade, and multilateralism. Trump’s 2016 electoral victory was significantly helped by the failure of that order and the US foreign policy that sustained it, to address the concerns of American domestic constituents left behind by free trade. Trump was able to exploit the backlash against globalization which was already brewing in some parts of the US, such as the mid-West, which had suffered job and income losses as factories and companies moved to other nations such as China, where production was cheaper and more efficient. His “America First” and “Make America Great Again”  slogans had deep resonance among the rural white lower middle class constituents (including white supremacists), who dislike globalism and have little understanding of the benefits of multilateral institutions. As Covid-19 pandemic hit, Trump condemned global supply chains – a key driver of globalization – as a threat to US national self-reliance on medical products. Trump was able to sell his base constituents the idea that the US had got a “bad deal” from multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organization, which was responsible for promoting global trade and the WHO which favored US competitors such as China at the expense of the US.

Trump’s “America First” policy, disdain for multilateral institutions, disrespect for US allies, and dismissal of democratic values not only weakened the liberal order, but also emboldened the more powerful challengers to that order, such as Russia and China.

Domestically, the Trump regime’s toxic mix of corruption, nepotism, racism, and ineptitude caused a serious erosion of US prestige and credibility around the world. Just look at the US death toll from the COVID-19, which now stands at 400,000. Such a high toll was not inevitable, with proper policies and management. Trump’s incitement of the Capitol insurrection on Jan 6, 2021 has made the US appear unstable and made a mockery of the US democracy and rule of law.

While repairing the damage will not be easy, there are several factors that might now help the Biden administration to stabilize world order and restore America’s global standing.

To begin with, defeat of Trump, the preeminent populist leader of a major nation in modern times, would discourage populist rulers. The fact that Trump not only lost the Presidency and the Senate but also leaving office with a one of the lowest approval ratings ever for a US president, is not a great advertisement for populism.

Biden’s victory should also be a warning to the current populist leaders in Brazil, Philippines, Turkey, Hungary, Israel, Venezuela, Poland and even India. Moreover, while Biden is unlikely to push for democracy promotion abroad, the regime change in Washington would dampen the spirits of the leaders of authoritarian regimes around the world, including North Korea, who got support from Trump. Nor can one expect President Biden encouraging populist policies in democratic nations, as Trump did within the US itself and in the UK, when he embraced Boris Johnson and Brexit.

President Biden brings back a high level of personal decency to the White House. His Vice-President, Kamala Harris, as well as his choice of senior level officials in his administration, symbolize the new administration’s respect for diversity and multiculturalism.

Biden can reverse a good deal of the loss of US prestige and influence during the Trump era with renewed commitment to global cooperation and multilateralism, and policies such as ending Trump’s anti-immigration stance, including the travel ban on visitors from several Muslim nations.

If Biden he succeeds in ensuring economic restoration, then he will steal thee thunder from other powerful nations in the world.

While the US faces major economic and political challenges, so do Russia and China as well as other emerging powers such as Brazil, India and South Africa. By being able to change its government and electing one with such fundamentally different ideology and political approach, the US actually has an advantage over other nations.

The Biden administration would restore the vigour of US alliances and multilateral institutions. Here, the damage inflicted by Trump is not irreversible. Without exception, US allies would welcome renewed US attention and engagement with them. To be sure, thanks to Trump’s affronts, the EU, led by France and Germany, have talked about “European sovereignty”, including greater self-reliance on security. Such talk will not disappear, but the rationale for this will be weaker if US reengages with its European allies through NATO and EU. The EU itself faces multiple challenges which would stifle its search for security self-reliance. It can do with American support.

America’s Indo-Pacific allies, especially Japan, South Korea, Australia remain heavily dependent on US security umbrella and would be relieved if, as likely, the Biden administration, pursues a more positive and respectful relations with them. All indications are that Biden’s foreign policy and security team would pursue a consultative approach towards the US allies, especially when and where their interests and involved.

On the multilateral front, Biden’s policy of returning the to the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization would be universally welcome. Regional organizations such as ASEAN would also expect a more positive relationship with the US, after the snub of Trump years.

The multilateral system faces a long-term structural crisis caused by financial difficulties, as well as demands for reform to make the UN more democratic and accountable. These problems are beyond the capacity of any single nation to resolve, but having a sympathetic US leadership committed to liberal internationalism helps. Trump rejected globalism in favour of patriotism and nationalism. No leader would reject patriotism, but President Biden is likely to find a way to reconcile nationalism with globalism.

To be sure, the US cannot bring back the golden years of its global primacy. Nor can it restore the liberal international order to its fullest previous extent. The emerging world order is going to be more pluralistic, “multiplex”, or less US- and West-dominated than it has been for the past few centuries. But if Biden can contain the pandemic and stabilize the US economy, while revitalizing US engagement with the world through respect for international norms and global institutions, the US would reemerge as a very respected and influential player in the changing world order.

Jake Sullivan, Distinguished Lecture at School of International Service, American University, Nov 8, 2012

Jake Sullivan, Distinguished Lecture at School of International Service, American University, Nov 8, 2012

(Summary of key points)

The world is changing.  Power shifts, new technologies, and empowered non-state actors are transforming the international arena.  And, according to Jake Sullivan, Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. needs to keep up with those changes, while still maintaining the leadership role that has characterized it since World War II.

During a talk  organized by the Transnational Challenges and Emerging Nations Dialogue, at the School of International Service on November 8, Sullivan gave his thoughts about the model of foreign policy that Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have implemented.  For the past four years, he has travelled to 112 countries with Secretary of State Clinton, and seen “up close and personal” the role of the U.S. in the world.

The Obama model is based on three premises: that the United States still has great convening power, that other countries still look to it for leadership, and that the world is changing. 

“The key point is that effective leadership has to look different than it did 20 years ago, because the world looks different,” said Sullivan.

He described four core values that will fulfill the task.  The first one is “leadership with purpose.”  Sullivan commented that, as in the past, the U.S. needs to work “beyond self interest…driven by the desire to be on the right side of history.”  This, according to him, is important in order to counter perceptions created by the most recent wars that the U.S. “is not a friend.”

The second value is “leadership through burden sharing.”  The aim is to have mutual responsibility, respect, and dialogue.  He mentioned the sanctions imposed by multiple countries on Iran as instructive of how burden can be shared. 

Nevertheless, he highlighted the importance of the U.S. in solving such problems.  “While it is true that no global challenge can be solved by just any one country, no global challenge can be solved without us.”

The third value is “leadership through enforcement of the rules.”

Professor Amitav Acharya, who is the UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Director of TRANSCEND at SIS, said that the biggest challenge for US foreign policy in the coming decades is how to deal with the rising powers, who want changes in international decision making structures and rules. According to Sullivan, the U.S. has to keep the international order, albeit with adjustments to global changes. Acharya noted that the U.S. needs to be more clear about which rules it wants to be kept and which it won’t mind changed.

Sullivan emphasized that they cannot allow any country “to pick and choose” the rules. However, Acharya argued  that “Western countries are as selective as the rising powers. There is no guarantee that the U.S. will play by the rules that it claims to advocate.”

The final value is “leadership by example.” “This means we need to put the house in order,” said Sullivan, referring to building a strong economy and political consensus.

With those guides, Sullivan seemed hopeful about what the United States could do for the rest of the world. “I have become jaded about many things in my job, but one thing I haven’t become jaded about is getting off that plane and thinking of what we can deliver to that country,” he affirmed.

American University Fall 2020 Convocation Address by Amitav Acharya, Scholar-Teacher of the Year

A video of the speech and the convocation is available at:

The following is the text of my address to the Fall 2020 Convocation of American University, Washington DC. The speech was live online on Aug 21, 2020 at 1pm. The address is traditionally given by the winner of American University’s highest honor: the Scholar-Teacher Award. The address included images of the Acharya in Robben Island prison (where Mandela was held), President Kennedy’s Conmencement Address to American University in 1963, and images of Mandela’s biography and Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s autobiography.

A write-up on the AU Scholar-Teacher Award at:


Hello the newest members of the AU community. Greetings.

I am the child of a pandemic. My father was born in a small village in India in 1915. Those days, India, like many other poor parts of the world, was plagued by killer infectious diseases, including small pox.

My father was a small pox survivor who bore its scars on his face for his entire adult life. And he lost not one, not two, but six siblings to small pox.

But my father persevered. He went on to become the first person from our village to earn a university degree. In fact he got two: in Arts and in Education. He built a very successful life as a High School headmaster. It was because of my father that I chose an academic career.

Today, you are embarking on the most important journey of your life in the most challenging of times. 

Never before in history have so many students the world over begun a new academic year entirely on-line.

Yet, these unprecedented times are also a huge opportunity to prove ourselves.

Your success at AU will both reassure and inspire the world’s present and future generations.

Through my life’s experience, I recognize diversity and inclusion when I see it.

You will not be alone. We the faculty and administrators of AU will be there with you every step of your journey with us.

Among AU’s most cherished qualities is our commitment to diversity, excellence  and inclusion. I have no doubt about it.

The first American whom I remember is President John F. Kennedy. Not that I meet him. I was only one year old when Kennedy was assassinated. But I remember him vividly because there was a framed picture of him and the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in our home.

In 1961, a year before I was born, Nehru visited Kennedy in the US.

The two had much in common. Kennedy was the leader of the world’s most powerful democracy. Nehru was the leader of the world’s largest democracy.

Both were staunch liberal internationalists, passionately committed to promoting diversity and cooperation in the world.

My father was a huge fan of both leaders. He clipped and framed a news-magazine cover of Kennedy and Nehru taking a stroll in the White House lawns. You can find that picture on the internet.

That picture was my first impression of what an American looks like.

That picture first inspired me to study and teach international affairs.

And that American, President John F. Kennedy, is a big part of American University. It was on this very campus that President Kennedy gave the Commencement Address to the graduating class of 1963.

There Kennedy said, and I quote:

“If we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity.”

The outdoor podium from which Kennedy spoke is still there. I urge you to visit it when you are next in campus, I hope very soon.

Three decades after Kennedy’s AU speech, another great leader of the 20th century, another of my personal heroes, invoked Kennedy’s words. His name is Nelson Mandela.

In an article published in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1993, Mandela wrote that he would strive, and I quote,  

“To promote institutions and forces that, through democratic means, seek to make the world safe for diversity.”

Thus Mandela wrote the very words that Kennedy had uttered on this very campus. I repeat:

“To make the world safe for diversity”.

In 2011, I had the privilege of being appointed as the Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of International Relations at Rhodes University, South Africa. Rhodes is located in South Africa’s Eastern Cape province, where Mandela was born. Visiting Mandela’s birthplace as well as the Robben Island prison where he was imprisoned for 27 years, are among the most moving experiences of my life.

Even though I am no politician, the words and actions of John F. Kennedy, Jawaharlal Nehru and Nelson Mandela have profoundly shaped my own academic leadership.

My best opportunity to do so came in 2014. That year I became the first non-white person to be elected as President of the International Studies Association. This is the world’s largest and most respected association for faculty and students in International Studies. In my Presidential Speech, I put the pictures and quotes of Kennedy and Mandela on a single slide on the screen, along with their immortal words.

And there I urged the academic community to make the study and practice of international affairs “safe for diversity”.

These words apply to every field of study…in the natural sciences, the social sciences, the humanities and beyond.

Today, as we cope with a deadly pandemic, it is equally vital that we strive to respect our diversity and promote inclusion.

And there can be no better place to do so than our very institution, American University.

As scholars and citizens of the world, each of us should persevere, as did Kennedy, Nehru and Mandela – and as did my father in his own time and way – to make our world safer for diversity.

Welcome, to American University.

Irresponsible Superpowers Must Cooperate

Irresponsible Superpowers Must Cooperate

Amitav Acharya

Tuesday, May 5, 2020

Governments that endured the SARS pandemic in 2003 were generally more prepared for Covid-19. Such pandemics emerge with little warning, challenging a global multilateral system largely structured around collective security and trade. Both diseases – linked with globalization, a complex phenomenon not easily reversed – offer lessons for global governance, signaling the need for adaptation and cooperation. “In recent years an array of emerging actors in a range of areas, including trade arrangements, climate change, humanitarian relief and health have contributed to growing fragmentation of global governance,” explains Amitav Acharya, distinguished professor of international relations at American University. The United States and China as leading powers each had missteps – the former abandoning global leadership and the second delaying global reporting. Angry exchanges of blame overshadow legitimate concerns expressed by each country. “The bottom line is that both the United States and China find the other’s conduct irresponsible and dangerous even as the world needs a norm of ‘responsibility to inform,’ as much as a ‘responsibility to protect,’” Acharya writes. He urges cooperation on global governance reforms to prepare for the new range of threats and, especially, a requirement for swift reporting of new and deadly diseases. – YaleGlobal


Irresponsible Superpowers Must Cooperate

Covid-19 response reveals that global powers and multilateral organizations need to improve their game on reforms, fact-finding, funding and more

Amitav Acharya

Tuesday, May 5, 2020

WHO and Xi

WHO is responsible for the delay? Director-General of WHO Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on January 28, but the joint fact-finding mission did not start its investigation until February 16; the world expressed amazement after the country imposed a lockdown for the city of Wuhan in January


WASHINGTON, DC: In the Covid-19 pandemic, neither China nor the United States has offered a creditable performance, and this puts immense pressure on the multilateral system.

Most countries escaped SARS-CoV-1 in 2003. The virus hit 26 countries and only eight Americans tested positive for SARS, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The United States and many other nations were not prepared 15 years later when a new coronavirus emerged, much more threatening to lives and well-being. The SARS-CoV-1 virus infected just over 8,000 people worldwide and left 774 dead. By comparison, with SARS-CoV-2, nations report more than 3.1 million confirmed cases, with 225,000 deaths. As I wrote in 2003, such perils, rooted in globalization, cannot be defeated permanently.


Disruptors: Severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, was a preview for Covid-19, but many nations did not prepare (Source: US Centers for Disease Control and Johns Hopkins University)

Of course, pandemics are not the only threat confronting the world. But unlike armed conflicts where early warning is available, or climate change, which threatens lives in a slow motion, pandemics emerge unexpectedly. And that is a severe challenge for the global multilateral system, in place since World War II. That system was built around big multilaterals of the UN system, such as the International Monetary Fund; the World Bank; the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, later the World Trade Organization; along with specialized agencies like the World Health Organization, founded in 1948. Despite many agencies and tasks, the system was fundamentally geared for collective security, the foundational principle of the UN system, deterring and defeating aggression. The system must adapt to newer threats that can be far more deadly than war.

In recent years an array of emerging actors in a range of areas, including trade arrangements, climate change, humanitarian relief and health have contributed to growing fragmentation of global governance. But none compares with Donald Trump, whose disdain for multilateralism is visceral. Under Trump, the United States abandoned responsibility to lead common responses to common challenges, whether on its own or through alliances and institutions.

Before the virus hit, the Trump administration proposed cutting $3 billion in global health funding, including $123 million for the World Health Organization for fiscal year 2020. At an 8 April White House briefing, Trump warned that the United States would “put a very powerful hold” on WHO funding and criticized the Covid-19 response: “They missed the call…They seem to be very China-centric.”

By rejecting travel restrictions, initially accepting China’s early denial of human-to-human transmission, and not declaring Covid-19 a global pandemic until March 11 – after 118,000 cases of infection in more than 110 countries – the WHO leaves itself open to criticism and investigations. Early warnings and fact-finding missions are critical in pandemics.

COVID Timeline

China remains a much stronger supporter of the existing multilateral system, at least in theory. But China has also moved to create parallel mechanisms like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative. The country, which has provided considerable bilateral aid to virus-stricken nations, first reported the coronavirus outbreak to WHO on 31 December. The WHO-China Joint Mission did not start until 16 February. It is fair to question whether an earlier mission might have provided timely information, prompting more action from the international community. According to a New York Times report, China held back on allowing a WHO mission, with sources blaming secretiveness, negligence, complacency and even a desire among Chinese scientists to produce the first publications on the new virus. WHO could have raised international attention, applying pressure for an earlier mission.

China also condemned Trump’s actions, such as ban on flights from China, as “excessive,” an example of how America “unceasingly manufactured and spread panic.” Yet the United States was not alone in banning flights, and Trump soon did the same for other nations. And the caution was warranted.

An angry Trump has suggested that if China was knowingly responsible, there “should be consequences.” The United States, the leading donor for WHO, is investigating whether the virus originated from a research laboratory in China, even though the organization suggests that no evidence suggests as much. Convincing proof is unlikely.

Still, any attempt by the United States to enter a confrontation with China would further destabilize the multilateral system, including global health cooperation. More US funding for global health would go to national and bilateral channels, or supporting a smaller health agency that might exclude China and other rivals.

The theatrics may have overshadowed efforts by others in the Trump administration to raise genuine concerns about China’s responsibility for transparency during the early stages of the crisis. As underscored by Deborah Birx, coordinator of the White House coronavirus task force, any country first exposed to a pandemic, has “a higher moral obligation on communicating and transparency.” Whether China met that transparency test, she added, could be investigated once the pandemic subsides. China would likely resist any such multilateral investigation into its domestic affairs. Still, other nations could develop a framework, as she advises, and “figure out really what has to happen for first alerts and transparency and understanding very early on.”

The bottom line is that both the United States and China find the other’s conduct irresponsible and dangerous even as the world needs a norm of “responsibility to inform,” as much as a “responsibility to protect.”

The multilateral system cannot address transnational threats like Covid-19 on its own. Such threats are linked to globalization, which cannot be entirely reversed. Pandemics emerged and spread during the Mongol Empire’s much smaller scale of globalization during the 14th century. That plague probably emerged in China before killing half of Europe’s population, then spreading on to India, Africa and the Middle East – eventually reducing the global population by almost 100 million.

As I wrote of the 2003 SARS crisis, the origins of pandemics cannot be regarded as exclusively external or internal to the region: “Rather, they emanate from external forces interacting closely with the internal vulnerabilities of states.” Hence, reducing internal vulnerabilities is a crucial first step.

Countries and territories that have done the early creditable work in containing Covid-19 were those that invested well in public health and early alert systems, after being devastated by SARS: Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore – the latter experiencing a spike in new cases, mostly among migrant workers.

At the same time, highly exclusionary and inward-looking responses will not work in the long term and could impose severe economic costs. Closing national boundaries, as many nations have done, can only be a temporary measure. It’s noteworthy that SARS 2003 did not lead to such closures, mainly because of the disease’s lower transmissibility and absence of asymptomatic transmission, but also because the world was operating under a climate of trust and coordination with fewer populists.

Hence, old attitudes towards sovereignty and non-interference that prevent fact-finding and international monitoring must change, especially in countries like China that aspire to be leaders in global governance.

The multilateral system can also do better. For example, giving WHO more funding is not enough. Stronger mandates are also required. Instead of cutting funding and emasculating the organization, the United States and other nations should push for the UN Security Council to require mandatory reporting and allow WHO fact-finding missions within days of a major outbreak. National reporting on terrorism to the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, now mandatory, could provide a model for pandemic preparations, with a shorter and incident-based reporting period.

The failure by any state to report outbreaks promptly and allow international fact-finding missions should be the equivalent of aggression. Most nations should readily agree after so many have endured thousands of human lives lost and trillions in economic losses.

Amitav Acharya is Distinguished Professor of International Relations, American University, Washington DC, and a 2019-20 fellow of the Berggruen Institute in California. He is the author of The Making of Global International Relations (Cambridge 2019); Constructing Global Order (Cambridge 2018); and The End of American World Order, 2nd edition (Polity 2018). 

This article was posted April 29, 2020.

Don’t Kill the WHO, but Make Its Reporting and Fact-finding Role Mandatory

China first reported the coronavirus  outbreak to WHO on 31Dec2019. Yet, first WHO mission to China began Feb16th. An earlier mission would have provided timely information & action by int. community? Early-warning & fact-finding critical here as in conflict zones

According to a New York Times report, China held back on allowing a WHO mission. Why? The reasons are explored in the article: Some have blamed it on the political system’s usual secretiveness and lack of transparency, negligence, complacency, scientific competition (desire among Chinese scientists to get the first publications on the new virus out),

In the meantime, Trump threatens further funding cut to WHO which was US$123 million for fiscal year 2020. At the White House briefing on 8 April, 2020, he said: The United States is “going to put a very powerful hold” on its funding of the WHO, adding “They called it wrong. They missed the call…They seem to be very China-centric…We have to look into that.”

Instead of cutting funding and fatally emasculating the WHO, the US and other nations should push for the UN Security Council to make it mandatory for states to report & allow WHO fact-finding within days of a major disease outbreak. It should treat failure by a state to report outbreaks promptly & allow WHO fact-finding missions equivalent of aggression

Terrorism reporting is now mandatory. The United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) can be a model, but shorter & incident-based reporting period for disease necessary.

“Understanding the Emerging Multiplex World Order”, Interview with the Global Governance Institute, University College London

Understanding the Emerging Multiplex World Order

1 July 2019

An interview with Professor Amitav Acharya, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor at the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC.


Professor Amitav Acharya 

Existing debates in International Relations (IR) and global governance are still Western-dominated, neglecting non-Western voices, experiences and agency. Do you think this is changing? Where do you see the biggest challenges? 

I think there is growing awareness of Western dominance in IR and global governance, both in the West and in the non-West, but this is not translating into sufficient action. Importantly, not everybody in the West wants to level the playing field. Indeed, some scholars have argued that American or Western dominance is beneficial to the field and not actually excluding or discriminating against anyone. Professor John Mearsheimer, for example, has called it a ‘benign hegemony’. I completely disagree with this view because there is a lot of gatekeeping going on and that is both a normative and an intellectual problem.

There are some interesting surveys that illustrate this gap between awareness and action. For example, a 2014 TRIP (Teaching, Research and International Policy) survey found that over 70% of respondents, which included mainly Western scholars, agreed that IR is a Western-centric discipline.* So, awareness is high. But when you ask the same people whether this is something that should be addressed, numbers are much lower, in particular among American scholars.

This is very disturbing because it undermines efforts to promote greater diversity. Diversity has become a priority concern for universities, journals and academic associations but this commitment is often very superficial and there is little progress when it comes to making real changes: reforming PhD programmes and training more Global South scholars, hiring more faculty from the Global South, changing text books, course offerings and literature lists, providing more citations to Global South scholars, accepting more journal submissions from the Global South, pluralising membership in academic committees, inviting more speakers from the Global South, etc.

There has been a similar debate on the barriers facing women in the field. 

Yes, and a lot more needs to be done in this area, too. However, the debate on gender equality has advanced much more. For example, it is now fairly difficult  to have a so-called ‘manel’ (a man-only panel) without attracting criticism, but panels without Global South representation are still very common – and this is no longer because of a lack of qualified speakers. And, of course, getting recognition for their work is especially difficult for women from the Global South. Many of them feel that mainstream feminist IR scholarship is exclusive and does not reflect their voices.

A point I would really like to emphasise here is that diversity is not just a normative concern but also a practical and an intellectual one. This is not just about getting more people to the table but also about getting new ideas on the table. In IR and global governance, many of the existing theories simply do not capture what’s happening in the world because they are derived from a very Eurocentric template. For instance, we talk about multilateralism as if it started with the 19th century Concert of Europe. Examples of multilateral practices outside the West are being routinely overlooked, although there are many, from the diplomatic practices of earlier civilizations such as Egypt and Mesopotamia to the post-World War II Asia-African Conference.

Similarly, dominant theories of regional integration have failed to take into account the history and culture of local communities. Consider, for example, the idea that the European Union (EU) should serve as a model for the rest of the world, which was especially prominent during the 1990s and 2000s. The EU’s efforts to promote its own model never worked elsewhere, even where other regions wanted to replicate it and where they were supported with finance and know-how. The model was simply too formulaic and the theories behind it did not consider local context.

So that is why diversity and inclusion is not just a normative imperative but also an analytical and intellectual concern. The rest of the world is much bigger than Europe – both in terms of physical size and population and in terms of history and cultural heritage. If we do not bring the ‘rest’ in, our theories will fall short and lack explanatory power.

Let’s talk about your book The End of American World Order. The first edition was published in 2014 and it documented the crisis of the US-led global liberal order, even before President Trump came into power (an updated and extended edition has been published in 2018). You also reflect on what will replace the current world order, suggesting that we are currently witnessing the emergence of a ‘multiplex’ world. How did you come up with this term and what does it entail?

The main reason why I introduced the concept of multiplex is because I did not like the term multipolar. Multipolarity is the conventional way of describing a world order that is neither bi-polar nor unipolar. But it is an outdated concept and it refers back to a very particular (pre-World War II) period in European history which is unlikely to repeat itself in the same way. I wanted to move away from this Eurocentric perspective, the sense of inevitable conflict and the idea of ‘going back to the future’.

I also felt that multiplex conveys the notions of both multiplicity and complexity. Multiplicity refers to the growing number and diversity of actors involved in making the global order, including not just states but also international institutions, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, transnational movements, individuals and other non-state actors. Complexity refers to the growing number of transboundary issues, many of which are not completely new but have become more prominent and more urgent. These issues are complex in the sense that they are multidimensional, often unpredictable (think about the 1997 and 2008 financial crises, for example, or the Ebola outbreak), and impossible to be addressed on the national level alone.

In the book, I also use a metaphor from the world of cinema and film. I suggest that the world will be like a multiplex theatre where the audience has the option of choosing between many different movies, actors, directors, producers and plots. In the 1950s, your local cinema would only show one movie at a time. Nowadays, we have far more choice and we do not even need a physical cinema anymore, we can carry our Netflix with us wherever we go. Cinematic entertainment is much more democratic and demand-driven. Today’s world order is somewhat similar. In a multiplex world, we have the choice between different narratives. There is the traditional narrative – the ‘Hollywood plot’ so to speak – about how the liberal world order was created almost single-handedly by the US. But there are also different narratives about how other countries and regions all played an important role in the making of world order. So the notion of multiplex allows us to pluralise plots, actors, directors and producers. And while producers can create demand to a degree, most of the time they will cater to the changing taste of the audience.

So, we are making the transition from a hegemonic world to a much more pluralistic and decentred world. A multiplex world is politically and culturally diverse but economically and functionally interconnected. Order is produced not just by a handful of great powers but by a multitude of actors, including established powers, emerging powers and non-state actors, who can use both material and ideational resources. This is a world which is quite different from the world of Western dominance we have experienced for the past 200 (we might even say 500) years, so it indicates a significant transformation of the world.

How do you think multiplexity will affect discussions on the legitimacy of global governance? 

That is a very fundamental question. In global governance there has always been a concern over what I would call the legitimacy-efficacy paradox. Traditionally, it has been thought that if you have more legitimacy – more representation, diversity and inclusion – you risk undermining efficacy because the group of actors involved becomes too big, making it difficult to reach any kind of consensus. On the other hand, if you have only a small group of actors, as in the G-7/8 model, the outcome might not be acceptable to those who were not involved in the decision-making process. Today, effective responses to global challenges are needed more than ever but you can no longer have a bunch of Western countries basically take all the decisions. Whether the issue is human rights, peace and security, finance or trade – solutions in all these areas will only be acceptable if they are being made with the participation of Global South countries.

So a multiplex world brings these tensions to the fore. However, having worked on different projects on global governance and world order over the past years**, I am now more and more convinced that legitimacy is key to efficacy. The two are not mutually exclusive unless you take a very narrow, utilitarian view of efficacy. I believe that efficacy refers to something that works not just for a few major players, something that does not encounter too much resistance. I also think that new ideas and perspectives are important to ensure efficacy, so consulting with a wider range of actors is likely to lead to better and more sustainable solutions.

A multiplex world is a G-Plus world, where leadership is shared and exercised by different groups of actors in different issue areas, depending on interests, expertise and capabilities. No country or bloc leads in every issue area. I think it is possible to create smaller groups that are legitimate – in that they represents a significant swath of humanity – and that still deliver efficacy. In my view, a good (though not perfect) example is G-20. G20 is very different from G-7/8; it has significant representation from the Global South and it is the first international institution where the Global South and the Global North interact as equals. G-20 was in fact quite effective in addressing the 2008 global financial crisis. It is by no means a perfect model and there are important concerns about representation – for example, Africa has only one seat in the G-20 – but it is much more legitimate than G-7/8 and is also more efficient when it comes to responding to financial crises. That said, G-20 does not fit the G-Plus model perfectly because it is still very state-centric. We now see new types of collaboration emerging in fields such as climate change and global health that involve not just states but also a range of non-state actors. These types of collaborations may have the potential of increasing both legitimacy and efficacy.

The debate on the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other rising powers has long focused on whether they are status quo powers that can be ‘co-opted’ into the existing liberal international order or revisionist powers that challenge the system as a whole – but you take a much more nuanced view. How do you see the role of the emerging powers in a multiplex world?

My approach has always been to avoid such binaries. First of all, I do not think emerging powers can be co-opted. Co-option as an idea was devised by proponents not just of liberal order but of liberal hegemony. The assumption basically was that China, India and other rising powers would support the US-led liberal order because they had benefitted so much from it. But the world does not work like that. It is politically not realistic to think that the new powers will simply accept everything the established group of powers have decided. And it is also institutionally impossible. The existing global institutions will have to change to accommodate new actors and new power constellations. The notion of co-option undercuts any idea of negotiation, change and concessions.

At the same time, I do not think the rising powers have the capacity or the unity to run the world on their own. The BRICS are a very diverse group of countries both in terms of political systems and economic development and there is also rivalry between some of the rising powers (e.g. between China and India). In addition, many BRICS countries and other regional powers such as Nigeria or Egypt do not have undisputed regional legitimacy and they are often tied up in regional rivalry and conflict. Countries such as China and India, for example, spend a lot of time looking after their neighbourhood and that takes resources and attention away from the global stage.

So we have a situation where neither the West nor the emerging powers can run lead the world on their own. They have to accommodate each other. The emerging powers cannot challenge the existing world order and multilateral system as a whole but they can disrupt and reshape. And the West cannot ignore, exclude or co-opt the emerging powers but it can negotiate space with them. I think this realisation has begun to sink in and it was reflected, for example, in the negotiation of the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement where China, India and others played an important role. The election of Donald Trump may have disrupted this process but I believe sooner or later the West and the ‘rest’ will have to come to an understanding – a multiplex understanding – that neither can do without the other. This will put an end both to the hype surrounding the emerging powers and to any fantasies that the US will be able to revive the liberal hegemony.

To new students of global governance today’s world may appear extremely complex, confusing and sometimes frightening. Do you have any advice? 

Well, first of all, I do not think today’s world is really frightening. It is challenging, yes, but it is also very exciting. There are so many things happening and so many new areas of research. In the old days, if you studied global governance you might have been bored to death studying UN Security Council voting or something similar. Now you can do global governance and go to a village in India and look at how international donors, non-state actors and the local municipal government collaborate to address climate change, asking questions such as: what global implications does this local partnership have? Can it be replicated elsewhere? So this is now a fantastically rich field of study.

Of course, there are concerns about peace and security, pandemics and other issues but most of these are not new. I do not think the world is less safe than before, in fact, broadly speaking it has probably become more secure in some areas. So, I think the overall message is positive, or at least mixed. For those teaching global governance, I believe curriculum planning is very important: rather than exclusively focusing on traditional theories, we should make sure that students are also exposed to new and emerging ideas, themes and literature. From my own teaching, I know that the idea of a multiplex world is very exciting for students from both the non-West and the West, because they see new possibilities for themselves and opportunities to make a difference.

So if I were to give a sort of motivational talk to new entrants to the field of global order and governance, this is what I would tell the students: there are more themes and more topics to explore, more opportunities, and more possibilities for building new theories and concepts. It is a very exciting time for anyone studying global governance or IR more broadly.

* For a discussion, see, Amitav Acharya, “Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions and Contributions,” International Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 2016): 4-15.

** These projects have resulted in three books: The End of the American World Order (Polity, 2014; 2018), Why Govern? Rethinking Demand and Progress in Global Governance(edited, Cambridge University Press, 2016) and Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

In June 2019, the UCL Global Governance Institute (GGI) hosted Professor Acharya as a Senior Visiting Fellow. This interview was conducted by Julia Kreienkamp (GGI Research Assistant) during his stay.

Amitav Acharya is the UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor at the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC. His recent books include The End of American World Order (Polity, 2014, 2018); Constructing Global Order (Cambridge, 2018); Why Govern: rethinking Demand and Progress in Global Governance (editor, Cambridge, 2016); and The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary (co-author with Barry Buzan, Cambridge, 2019). His articles have appeared in International OrganizationInternational SecurityInternational Studies QuarterlyInternational AffairsForeign AffairsThe National Interest, and World Politics. He has contributed op-eds to Financial TimesWashington Post (Monkey Cage Blog), International Herald Tribune/New York TimesTimes of IndiaAustralian Financial Review, and YaleGlobal Online, and appeared in BBC, CNN, CNBC, and National Public Radio (NPR) and other media. He was appointed to be the inaugural Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of International Relations at Rhodes University, South Africa during 2012-13 and the inaugural Boeing Company Chair in International Relations at the Schwarzman Scholars Program at Tsinghua University during 2016-18. He has held fellowships at Harvard’s Asia Center and John F. Kennedy School of Government during 1999-2001, and was elected to the Christensen Fellowship at Oxford in 2013. He is the first non-Western scholar elected to lead the International Studies Association (ISA), the world’s largest and most influential association on international studies. ISA has honored him with two Distinguished Scholar Awards: in 2015 for his “outstanding contribution to scholarship on non-Western IR theory and inclusion in IR” and another in 2018 for “exceptional… influence, intellectual works and mentorship” in the field of international organization.

“Causes of China-US tensions go beyond trade” – Amitav Acharya, Interview with Global Times, 18 June 2019

“Causes of China-US tensions go beyond trade” – Amitav Acharya, Interview with Global Times, 18 June 2019.

Editor’s Note:

Due to stepped up trade frictions between China and the US, ties between the two giants tend to be tense. What is the nature of their conflict? Will the current China-US conflict lead to a new cold war? Global Times (GT) reporters Lu Yuanzhi and Bai Yunyi interviewed Amitav Acharya (Acharya), Professor of International Relations at American University, Washington DC. The distinguished academic shared his insights on these issues.

Amitav Acharya

GT:  What do you think is the nature of China-US conflict? The competition in the domain of economy and technology between the two giants, a superpower’s suppression of a rising power, social and economic contradictions that both countries cannot reconcile, or clash of two civilizations?  What is the basis of your judgement?

Acharya: No single factor or phrase can capture or explain the nature of the US-China conflict; it is a complex combination of issues and triggers. The most immediate trigger behind the current US-China trade war is economic and technological competition. From a long-term perspective, however, it is fueled by wider changes in the international system. It is important to avoid labels such as “new Cold War,” “clash of civilizations,” or “Thucydides’ trap,” or any catch phrases that risk turning into self-fulfilling prophecies. I would prefer to see the current tensions between the US and China as the result of three shifts: in power, order, and policy. And these are inter-linked.

First, the economic rise of China is part of a broader global power shift away from the West. This has been going on for some time, with China and India, whose economic fortunes took a sharp dive with the rise of European colonialism a few centuries ago, reviving themselves steadily and in China’s case spectacularly, since the latter part of the 20th century. China is now the world’s second largest economy (in current dollar value terms) and many estimates see a general “rise of the rest” in the global economy. It should not surprise that the scale and pace of China’s rise is proving to be unnerving for the US and the West and has led to a rethink of the US’ policy of engaging China, thereby encouraging more hardline approaches.

Second, there has been a substantial erosion of the US-led liberal international order which has been around since the end of World War II. The liberal order refers to a system of rules and institutions devised by the US after World War II to legitimize its dominance and manage international order with itself at the helm. This order had been facing challenges well before the Trump presidency, as documented in my 2014 book, The End of American World Order, but the Trump administration’s policies have hastened it. One should keep in mind that Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election was to a large extent brought about by his ability to exploit populist concerns about the decline of the US and the need to “Make America Great Again.” Part of his appeal lay in presenting the existing liberal order of institutions and norms as being incapable of coping with the challenge from the rise of China and other powers in order to preserve the dominant position of the US and the West. This undercut the prevailing assumption, held by many Western leaders, analysts and people that the liberal order would be powerful and resilient enough to win the acquiescence of potential challengers like China, who may even contribute to its strengthening. The realization that this expectation was not materializing opened the door to a more nationalist and unilateralist US foreign economic and strategic approach to international relations under Trump.

This in turn produced the third shift, which is shift in policy toward China (and we should not forget, toward other emerging powers such as India and Mexico). This policy shift also reflects US domestic politics. The US is now under an administration whose ideology and foreign policy approach are drastically different from that of its predecessors. The Trump administration believes that the policy of engaging China pursued by previous presidents from Clinton to Obama was misconceived and has failed. Many Americans, though not all, are disappointed and disillusioned about this. China’s pursuit of a much more active global foreign policy commensurate with its rising power and resources, including through initiatives such as the Belt and RoadInitiative (BRI), further stoked American concerns and fears.

In sum then, the causes of the current US-China discord are deeper and more structural than just competition over tariffs and technology. It’s rooted in the transitional forces in world order, from the era of Western hegemony to the advent of what I have called a “Multiplex World,” a culturally diverse but interconnected world with multiple and overlapping nodes of power and authority.

GT: Do you think the current China-US conflict will lead to a new cold war, or something resembles Cold War? Some believe, with the beginning of the US overall cracking down on Huawei, the digital iron curtain is descending between the two nations. How do you think about this view?

Acharya: There is no question that the US-China relations today are far more strained than they were a few years ago. But invoking the metaphor of a “Cold War” obscures differences between the past competition between the US-led and the Soviet Union-led blocs and the current Sino-US relationship. No two historical epochs are exactly alike. The degree of economic interdependence between the US and China is much deeper and wider than that between the US and Soviet blocs, and this matters. Economic interdependence does not prevent war, but it does raise the costs of pursuing conflict over cooperation that should induce caution in both players. Also, the Cold War was fought between two blocs, this competition is between two individual powers; the US is not acting multilaterally against China and if anything, imposing tariffs against its own allies and friends.

GT: In view of current China-US relations, what major risks do you think the two states need to avoid? Do you predict the conflicts between the two would spread beyond the existing fields of trade and technology, or even head for a full-blown conflict?

Acharya: The most urgent need is to step back and avoid playing brinkmanship or further escalate the trade war. Second, engage in negotiations, without the threat of tight deadlines, to reach a mutually acceptable and sustainable economic relationship, which requires concessions and compromises from both sides. Third, ensure that there are lines of communication always open to manage and de-escalate any military engagements, including accidents.

GT:  Elections in 2020 are on the horizon. What impact will they have on addressing China-US conflict?

Acharya: It will be interesting to see if the eventual Democratic challenger to Trump comes up with an alternative vision or approach to the US-China relationship. Usually, US elections are mostly about domestic politics, but if the trade war continues, it is likely that the US-China relationship and the larger issue of reviving liberal internationalism will be an important factor in the 2020 elections as they straddle both domestic and foreign policy domains. Much depends on how far trade affects the US economy and whether the effects on US population are significant enough to affect voter attitudes.

GT: Do you think US elites’ vigilance toward China is close to the level of “red terror” against the Bolsheviks after the World War I and McCarthyism after the World War II? How consistent is the attitude of US government and elites toward China with that of ordinary US people?

Acharya: I believe ideology is a less important factor driving US-China relations than that between the Soviet Union and the US. During the Cold War, the Communist powers actively supported Communist rebellions against pro-Western governments through ideological propaganda and material support; this is not happening now. The US elite is divided over how to deal with China. While many agree that the US-China relationship needs to be recalibrated and reset, they differ especially over how to achieve such recalibration and change. One part of the US foreign policy community believes that the US-China competition can be managed differently, with the help of America’s allies and with the involvement of multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organization.

GT: If China and the US enter a protracted confrontation, how will it influence world political order and sustainable global development?

Acharya: There are many moving parts and uncertainties here. If the trade war persists or escalates and spreads to other areas of the US-China relationship, the consequences could be far more severe for the world than the impact of the Cold War, at least economically. While the Cold War did not damage the overall economic strength of the US and its allies and might have benefitted them, the current US-China competition, if not checked by mutual restraint and compromises, could wreck the global economy and prosperity for a long time. Yet, there is a chance that after a period of rising tensions, cooler heads will prevail, especially if the signs of mutual damage are clear, and the situation is a stalemate, without a possibility of one side winning decisively. This might hit home the importance of coordination and cooperation. Under different leadership, there might be an urge to revive cooperation and multilateralism to avoid such conflicts in the future.

Last but not the least, since the end of World War II, the United States has been in a position of global hegemony or primacy, no matter whatever you call it. Naturally, it wants to keep it that way. It’s difficult for the US to reconcile itself to the idea of being eclipsed by another country. It is rare to find a foreign policy vision in the West that outlines how the US can lead or live in a world where it’s no longer enjoys global primacy. For China, there is a history of being No.1, at least in East Asia, which was severely undercut by the Western powers around the 19th century. And many in China want to see their country rise again to global pre-eminence. So it seems to me that this competing self-imagery of global primacy is part of the reason behind the current US-China conflict.



Click to access the-new-201cmultiplex201d-world-2.pdf

In this interview with Helen Suzman Foundation Researcher, Tove van Lennep, Amitav Acharya reflects on the internal crisis of the liberal world order and the advent of a new “Multiplex World” of multiple, crosscutting international orders. Although not all emerging hegemons are committed to progressive values, multiplexity does not necessarily imply a decline in global justice and commitment to human rights. The liberal international order functioned as a club of the West, under which democracy was promoted selectively and human rights abuses were rife. The weakening of the Club may create more openings for weaker actors, state or non-state, to play a greater role in global governance.

TOVE: Beginning with the concept at the heart of this edition of FOCUS, what should
be understood by the “liberal international order”?

ACHARYA: This is a very fuzzy concept, as different people use it differently and there is no agreed definition. At its simplest, the liberal international order (LIO) means the US-crafted and -dominated system of multilateral institutions after World War II. But the concept has also been used to refer more generally to a “rules-based” system that is open  to all states. Another aspect of LIO directs attention to liberal values and norms, such as human rights, democracy and free market capitalism. These are not mutually exclusive; so, one might say that the LIO concept incorporates capitalism, democracy and  multilateralism under US hegemony.
TOVE: In your paper ‘After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order’  you argue that the current challenge to the liberal order is ‘as much, if not more, from  within as from without’. You view Trump’s ascent to power as a consequence rather than a cause of its decline. What then is responsible for the decline, or indeed, implosion of liberal hegemony?

ACHARYA: Several factors. One is the global economic shift, with the rise of non Western  nations led by China and India but also more generally East Asia. One consequence of this economic shift has been the transfer of industries and jobs to these rising economies. This has created a backlash against globalisation in parts of the US that relied heavily on traditional heavy industries. Trump was able to exploit this populist backlash against  globalisation and free trade to win votes in traditionally Democratic states of the US in the 2016 presidential election.

Another domestic factor was race. The Obama Presidency, the first black presidency of the US with its progressive policy on healthcare and commitment to diversity,  paradoxically triggered greater racial consciousness and polarisation in the country. This was exploited by the intellectual defenders of white supremacy which saw the Obama  presidency as having empowered black people and other minorities. Trump was unabashed in stoking these sentiments.

A third and closely related factor was the growing political and ideological polarisation within the US, especially between the two dominant political parties. This was fuelled by an increasingly partisan media. This cracked whatever consensus there  was on liberal values and created severe divisions over issues such as gun control, immigration and health care. Among other things, the confluence of these factors contributed to a serious internal crisis of the liberal order in the US. And while contributing to Trump’s success (however narrow the margin of his victory might have been), polarising factors were gathering force well before Trump announced his candidacy as President of the United States.
TOVE: In ‘After Liberal Hegemony’ you describe ‘a “multiplex world” in which elements of the liberal order survive, but are subsumed in a complex of multiple, crosscutting international orders’. Does the “multiplex world” you envisage promise more justice and equality? Or will emerging hegemons, unrestrained by liberal multilateralism and the United States, merely rearrange the current shape of global inequality and injustice?

ACHARYA: The “Multiplex World” concept stresses decentring of power and authority: a world without the hegemony of a single power or a single set of values. Multiplex also implies different layers of governance, global, regional and local, in addition to the traditional national level. The rise of non-Western actors (including global and regional powers) and, more generally, the growing importance of regions are hallmarks of the Multiplex World. These developments are bound to reshape the traditional architecture of multilateralism and global governance. This means a growing voice for the new actors. But one should not think only in terms of emerging powers, or even states; the Multiplex World concept also implies the rise of non-state actors and new types of international cooperation and governance mechanisms which are regional or based on hybridity, e.g. partnerships between states, international institutions and private actors.

The “Multiplex World” concept stresses decentring of power and authority: a world without the hegemony of a single power or a single set of values. Multiplex also implies different layers of governance, global, regional and local, in addition to the traditional national level.

While I would not draw any necessary correlation between multiplexity and greater justice and equality, the latter could be a possible outcome of the new ordering as the US and Western dominance of the world diminishes and the roles of a range of new actors become more consequential. Not all of them are committed to progressive values; indeed, some of the non-state actors can be reactionary and even destructive. And some of the rising powers could be parochial in defending their interests and values. But the  US was not always a defender of liberal multilateralism either. The LIO functioned as a club of the West, rather than a provider of universal public goods. The international institutions of the LIO were dominated by the West; their governance and decision-making were not all that democratic and sometimes not even transparent. So, the weakening of the Club may create more openings for weaker actors, state or non-state, and not just a handful of emerging powers, to play a greater role in global governance.

TOVE: What does the decline of the liberal hegemonic order and the emerging “multiplex world” imply for those states in which democracy is fragile and human rights abuses rife?

ACHARYA: I really don’t see a necessary link between the weakening of liberal hegemony and the rise of human rights abuses since these abuses, were fairly abundant during the heyday of the LIO which was rather selective and self-serving in promoting democracy around the world. Some may think that the end of liberal hegemony might embolden autocrats and human rights violators. And this is quite possible. But the logic is not so simple. Some states in the developing world – such as Indonesia and India – have their domestic reasons for adhering to elections and protection of rights; since the probable alternative of chaos and disorder will threaten economic growth and the stability of their governments. Repression has bad political consequences over a period of time, with or without external pressure.

In view of this, one consequence of the breakdown of liberal hegemony might be that the fate of human rights and democracy will be driven more by domestic than international factors. At the same time, norms and pressures for these values may come more from social movements and NGOs than from states. The European Union may be more consequential than the United States in championing these values. But generally, the importance of domestic forces will be stronger.

TOVE: Many fear that the global order is retreating into a state of anarchy or disorder. With the decline of US-assured multilateralism, what new form(s) could global cooperation and governance take?

ACHARYA: As I have already hinted, multilateralism was never US-assured, as you put it. The US pursued it selectively and showed more favour to ideologically like-minded  countries and countries that were strategically aligned to it. I argue that in the new world order, global cooperation will be more fragmented. I have coined the term G-Plus world, as an alternative to G-7, G-20 or G-Zero (to use international consultant Ian Bremmer’s term). G-pLus means a more complex form of global governance, where leadership can be exercised by different actors in different issue areas. Traditional multilateral institutions like the UN, World Bank and IMF are joined, but not replaced, by regional institutions such as the EU, the African union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as newer arrangements such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Chiangmai Initiative to I really don’t see a necessary link between the weakening of liberal hegemony and the rise of human rights abuses, since these abuses were fairly abundant during the heyday of the LIO which was rather selective and self-serving in promoting democracy around the world. Some may think that the end of liberal hegemony might embolden autocrats and human rights violators. And this is quite possible. But the logic is not so simple. Some states in the developing world – such as Indonesia and India – have their domestic reasons for adhering to elections and protection of rights; since the probable alternative of chaos and disorder will threaten economic growth and the stability of their governments. Repression has bad political consequences over a period of time, with or without external pressure. In view of this, one consequence of the breakdown of liberal hegemony might be that the fate of human rights and democracy will be driven more by domestic than international factors. At the same time, norms and pressures for these values may come more from social movements and NGOs than from states. The European Union may be more consequential than the United States in championing these values. But generally, the importance of domestic forces will be stronger.

TOVE: Many fear that the global order is retreating into a state of anarchy or disorder. With the decline of US-assured multilateralism, what new form(s) could global cooperation and governance take?

ACHARYA: As I have already hinted, multilateralism was never US-assured, as you put it. The US pursued it selectively and showed more favour to ideologically like-minded countries and countries that were strategically aligned to it. I argue that in the new world order, global cooperation will be more fragmented. I have coined the term G-Plus world, as an alternative to G-7, G-20 or G-Zero (to use international consultant Ian Bremmer’s term). G-Plus means a more complex form of global governance, where leadership can be exercised by different actors in different issue areas. Traditional multilateral institutions like the UN, World Bank and IMF are joined, but not replaced, by regional institutions such as the EU, the African union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as newer arrangements such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Chiangmai Initiative to address financial crises. No single country may lead in every issue area. And there could be possibility for joint or shared leadership over issues such as climate change or refugees and global health.

Conflict and disorder are not new to our world; the LIO was rife with them, especially when it came to the developing world. And they will rise in some areas or regions and diminish in others. Generally, as I have pointed out in my essays and book (The End of American World Order, Polity 2014, 2018), we have a very mixed picture when it comes to armed conflicts. Some forms, such as inter-state war, have diminished; others, such as intra-state conflicts and civil wars, rise and recede. It has become clear, however, that there are some long-term factors that contribute to stability, including economic growth and development, poverty reduction and norms against international violence. Nobody can claim that the future will be peaceful, but the possibility of global disorder has been exaggerated by the proponents of liberal hegemony.
TOVE: Can the issues around ‘identity’ and the demand for recognition be considered a norm transforming national and international systems? Is this the form which nationalism takes in the early 20th century?

ACHARYA: One should not forget that identity can manifest itself at different levels; ethnic, sub-state, national, regional and even international. Identity can have positive and negative dimensions and consequences for international order. With the diminishing memory of colonialism, which was a shared basis of common identity in the developing world, national identities can become more forceful. But this is offset by the rise of common transnational challenges, such as climate change, where cooperation is essential to achieve desired outcomes. International and regional norms and mechanisms for “socialisation”, as well as transnational social movements, are still proliferating and can foster shared identity and blunt the edge of narrow and competitive national identities. In a Multiplex World, we will see multiple identities, both competing as well as co-existing and overlapping.
TOVE: How do we understand non-alignment in the developments currently taking place in the global system?

ACHARYA: Non-alignment was a response to the Cold War and it cannot exist in the same form now. But one enduring lesson of the non-alignment norm for the developing countries such as those in Africa today is not to take sides in great power competition, such as that between the US and China. In a Multiplex World, we are more likely to see multi-alignment or cross-cutting alignments. The key challenge is to ensure that these alignments do not generate competition or conflict and are geared to protecting the collective interests of the regions and the world.
TOVE: Finally, what are your reflections about Africa’s role in the evolution of the international system? Will Africa be a rule taker or a rule maker?
ACHARYA: I believe that Africa has potential to have more agency, or to make a greater contribution in shaping the future world order. The key to this is Africa’s economic development and its willingness and ability to carry out regional collective action; whether it is done through the AU or on some other collective basis. Of course, Africa is a vast region, with a tremendous diversity of cultures, and political systems. Generating effective cooperation is never easy, but Africa has much to contribute to humanitarian action, protection of the environment and global health. Africa should embrace G-Plus leadership, and develop greater cooperation involving states, international institutions, regional bodies and non-state actors.