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The idea that the international order is stronger than ever is not shared by those often on the receiving end of its coercive tactics.
Amitav Acharya, Responsible Statecraft, MARCH 29, 2022
Among its wide ranging consequences for international order, Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine invasion and its triggering of sweeping Western sanctions against Russia have spurred hopes for a revival of U.S. leadership and Western unity in global affairs.
As Stewart Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations has written, “In one fateful step, the Russian president has managed to revive Western solidarity, reenergize U.S. global leadership, catalyze European integration, expose Russia’s weaknesses, undermine Moscow’s alliance with Beijing, and make his authoritarian imitators look foolish.”
Putin has given the idea of “the West” a fresh lease of life, at least in Western societies. “Pro-Ukraine feelings in search of an organizing principle,” according to Slate’s Lili Loofbourow, are coalescing around a category of identification that hasn’t enjoyed real, popular international relevance in a good long while: ‘the West’—a category Vladimir Putin has long railed against, but which Westerners themselves haven’t, at least in recent years, claimed with much personal attachment or ideological loyalty.”
But Western analysts are not alone their assessment of a possible Western revival. From China, Hu Wei, vice-chairman of the Public Policy Research Center of the Counselor’s Office of the State Council, expects that as a result of the Ukraine crisis, “[t]he power of the West will grow significantly, NATO will continue to expand, and U.S. influence in the non-Western world will increase…[N]o matter how Russia achieves its political transformation, it will greatly weaken the anti-Western forces in the world… The West will possess more “hegemony” both in terms of military power and in terms of values and institutions, its hard power and soft power will reach new heights.”
Not so fast. There is another school of thought, that while the Russian invasion is deeply self-injurious, it could hasten the West’s decline, or at least create a more level playing field between the West and the Rest when it comes to moral leadership of the international order.
“One of the defining features of the new era is that it is post-American,” charged Fareed Zakaria after the invasion was launched. “By that I mean that the Pax Americana of the past three decades is over.” Zakaria himself had written about a “post-American world” since at least the 2008 financial crisis, but he was referring then to the rise of other powers relative to the U.S. Until now, he had refused to accept the breakup of the post-1945 U.S.-built liberal international order. In reality, as this author argued in 2014, the U.S.-led global system had been moving toward life support. And the Ukraine conflict has moved it closer to pulling the plug.
Aside from the fact that China, India, and South Africa abstained on the U.N. General Assembly vote on March 2 condemning Russia, those developing countries that voted in favor of the resolution were not, by doing so, voicing their support for the revival of this U.S.-led order. Among sub-Saharan countries, for example, voting on that resolution was 28 in favor with 17 abstentions.
At the same time, no matter how much Western leaders may dislike the term, “moral equivalence” between Russian invasion and past U.S. interventions is being drawn. To cite Amin Saikal, an Afghan-Australian scholar and a leading authority on Middle East: in invading Ukraine, “President Vladimir Putin has deftly observed and exploited the past misdeeds and current limitations of the United States…The Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan fiascos are a powerful reminder of the moral lapses and human tragedies that the U.S. and some of its allies were responsible for in those countries.”
In other words, it is not entirely inconsistent for the “Global South” to both condemn the Russian invasion on principle and express criticisms of Western “internationalism” and its double standards.
The sweeping sanctions on Russia, which were criticized by Brazil despite having voted for the resolution, remind developing nations of the coercive economic power of the West, which may be — and has been used — against them if they fail to protect or uphold Western interests and expectations.
African and Middle Eastern governments and media have also pointed to the harsh treatment of refugees from their own regions in Eastern Europe, including on the Ukrainian border, not to mention the issue of the West’s own record of military intervention. As Gilles Yabi, the founder of WATHI, a “citizen think tank” in Senegal, noted, “In Africa, we are… stunned by this invasion of Ukraine by Russia… This is unjustifiable, as were the interventions of the United States and NATO in many countries, sometimes under false pretenses and in flagrant violation of international law.”
The attempts by Western policymakers and analysts to reject any moral equivalence between Russian and U.S./NATO interventions are not entirely convincing to the non-Western world.
Some non-Western countries also resent the pressure from the West, as revealed in Pakistani premier Imran Khan’s “are we your slaves” outburst in March when confronted with a missive from Western ambassadors urging Islamabad to unequivocally condemn Russia’s invasion.
Much depends on whether the Ukraine conflict ends with the humiliating defeat of Russia or the collapse of European and Western unity. But a war at the heart of Europe that has already taken a terrible toll in human lives and inflicted major damage on both Ukraine and Russia is not a glowing advertisement for the approach to regional and international order that the West had envisaged. It shows the limits and dangers of the post-Cold War European project of continental peace and stability.
For background, as the Cold War ended, European concepts such as “common security,” pan-European identity, or “European common home,” as articulated by the Palme Commission in 1982 and promoted by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, drew global attention. U.S. presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton enthused about the vision of a Europe that is “whole, free and at peace.”
But as the Economist magazine noted earlier this month, “As much as the war’s reverberations are felt around the world…[it] has upended the idea of a continent “whole, free and at peace.” With this the idea of Europe (and the West) as a model of conflict management for other regions such as Southeast Asia, Africa, or Latin America, takes a beating.
In its most recent Strategic Compass issued on 22 March, the EU reminded of it being “a consistent leader investing in effective multilateral solutions,” of its “crisis management missions and operations operating on three continents” and its “global security responsibilities.” But if Europe cannot put its own house in order, how can it be taken seriously as a conflict manager outside.
Finally, while a debate rages over whether Putin’s imperial ambition or the threat posed by NATO expansion was responsible for the Ukraine invasion, it is also clear that many Western policy-makers, including George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretaries William Perry and Robert Gates, and current CIA Director William Burns, had warned against the latter. That such warnings went unheeded not only smacks of America’s geopolitical arrogance or incompetence, or both, it also reminds the world of the perils of the U.S. entanglements in security alliances in general.
There was a time not long ago when Europe was seen by much of the world as a model for peace and cooperation. The Cold War had ended with the peaceful implosion of the Soviet Union. The European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other similar institutions were seen as a beacon for the rest of the world, including Asia and the Middle East, to emulate. Europe was “primed for peace,” wrote Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Stephen Van Evera in 1991. Princeton scholar Aaron Friedberg concurred: “The movement toward democracy, equality, and cosmopolitanism in each of the states in Europe, the increasingly dense and diverse linkages between them and the mounting costs and declining benefits of war among them have mutually reinforcing effects” and “taken as a whole their impact would be ‘overwhelming’” in creating conditions for peace.
Today all these claims are shattered. How did Europe come to this? What are the implications for world order? While the Ukraine situation continues to evolve, some consequences immediately come to mind.
To begin with, the Ukraine crisis is another nail, perhaps the final one, in the coffin of postwar liberal order. The order was already fraying due to a global economic shift from the West to China, among others. That shift was in motion even before President Trump assumed office with a foreign policy agenda that distrusted both economic globalization and multilateral institutions. President Biden upon taking office pledged to “repair our alliances and engage with the world once again.” But the Ukraine crisis would go on to impede multilateralism, paralyze the U.N. Security Council, and severely limit cooperation among the major powers. It would return the world to opposing power blocs where the U.S. and its NATO allies faced Russia and China.
Predictably, in confronting Russian President Vladimir Putin, Biden has turned to NATO. There have been celebrations about renewed NATO unity brought about by Putin’s provocations. But NATO has been as much part of the problem as of the solution. Writing in the New York Times in 1997, George F. Kennan, the father of the U.S. “containment” strategy against the Soviet Union, warned, “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.” Kennan’s warning has proven correct. Some influential commentators, such as former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul vigorously reject the view that NATO expansion had anything to do with Putin’s Ukraine move. But alliances are known to provoke as much as deter conflict. In fact, recognition of the war-making effects of Europe’s alliances led President George Washington to pursue a foreign policy “to steer clear of permanent alliances,” while the same distrust led Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt to advocate a universal security system.
The Ukraine crisis not only challenges peace in Europe, it will also test U.S. global strategic goals. The U.S. is now facing the prospect of a two-front war, especially if Putin’s military moves go beyond Ukraine. In sending troops to Ukraine, Putin has threatened to inflict “consequences you have never encountered in your history” on countries that try to stop him, a threat directed more at Europe, including the new NATO nations in the Baltic, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, than at the U.S. Biden has said that the U.S. had “no intention of fighting Russia”, but he also wants to “send an unmistakable message that the United States together with our allies will defend every inch of NATO territory and abide by the commitments we made to NATO.” Some of that territory could well turn out to be those of these Baltic states. But it is not unreasonable to ask: Will the U.S. risk a nuclear war to defend Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn?
More important, can Washington put adequate resources to defend NATO while also pursuing a vigorous Indo-Pacific strategy directed at China? The U.S. was able to win the Cold War by concentrating on one enemy—the Soviet Union—especially after U.S.-China rapprochement neutralized Chinese hostility following the Nixon visit almost exactly half a century ago. This helped the U.S. to counter the Soviet Union’s geopolitical adventures in places such as Cambodia and Afghanistan, ultimately leading to its decline and fall. Now, Russia and China are ganging up against the U.S. Beijing, as an ardent defender of nonintervention, has remained almost silent in the U.N. Security Council debates over Ukraine.
China could secure geopolitical gains if Washington’s attention and resources are diverted to Europe, an ironic reversal of the “rebalancing” strategy pursued by the Obama administration, and working against the purpose of the withdrawal from Afghanistan conceived by Trump and completed by Biden with unseemly haste. The Ukraine invasion comes at a time when China is mounting new military pressure on Taiwan. It may be argued that Ukraine could turn out to be Putin’s Afghanistan, thereby sparing the U.S. the strategic burden of a two-front war. But Ukraine is no Afghanistan. It is much closer geographically and culturally to Russia than Afghanistan. The strategic stakes for Russia in Ukraine are far greater than they were in Afghanistan, not the least due to the continuing pressure from NATO. Putin is not going to leave Ukraine alone without significant concessions from the West, including non-membership in NATO, which the U.S. has ruled out. And if Biden makes similar commitments to nation-building in Ukraine as the U.S. made to Afghanistan, it will turn out to be Biden’s Afghanistan rather than Putin’s.
Former Foreign Minister of Indonesia and Secretary-General of the Bandung Conference
Interview conducted by: Professor Amitav Acharya
April 25, 2002
Preface to Interview with Dr Roselan Abdulghani (Amitav Acharya)
Most students of Asian politics and international relations have heard about the Asia-Africa Conference held in the Indonesian town of Bandung between 18 and 24 April 1955. Attended by 29 nations, the conference discussed cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa, their social, economic and cultural problems, problems affecting national sovereignty, racialism and colonialism, and the contribution of Asian and African countries to world peace and cooperation.
The Secretary-General of this historic conference was Dr Roselan Abdulghani. At the time of the conference, he was the secretary-general of the Indonesia Foreign Ministry. Later, he became President Sukarno’s Foreign Minister, and the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN.
On April 22, 2004, I had the privilege of interviewing him in Jakarta. Dr Roselan was 88 years old, frail, but in good mind and spirit. Our conversation lasted for an hour. During the interview, I had the opportunity to seek his reflections on several aspects of the conference:
Why did Indonesia organize this conference?
What were the main issues discussed and debated at the conference?
How effective were the procedures adopted at the conference?
What was his impressions of some of the key leaders at the conference, such as Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Chou En-Lai of China? And
What is the main legacy of the Bandung Conference?
In the interview that follows, Dr Roselan provides clear and insightful answers to these questions. What comes through here is one of the finest diplomatic histories of that time by one of the most distinguished and ablest diplomats the developing world has ever produced.
AA: Tell me why Indonesia decided to organize the Bandung Conference.
RA: Well, as you know, in 1953, 1954, we faced the danger of the Vietnam War spreading to Southeast Asia. We felt that there was a danger. Secondly, we were fighting, at that time, against Dutch colonialism about West Irian. And that was a tough struggle, and we were of the opinion that colonialism was an international problem. So to fight off colonialism, we should also fight on an international level. That means that the Asian-African countries, who were at that time still colonized, should be mobilized. Thirdly, we wanted an economic cooperation between these countries who were not yet technically developed. And lastly, there was President Sukarno’s dream in 1930, 1932, during the colonial period. He said that the benteng of Indonesia, the bullof Indonesia, should cooperate with the lembu mandi of India, with the barong, the dragon of China, with the tiger of Philippines, also with the white elephant of Thailand. And if we all cooperated in fighting against colonialism, then we would win. Therefore, his idea of having a Conference of Asia and Africa was motivated by the situation at the time, but also by the dream he had in 1930.
For the Colombo Conference between the five South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Burma and Indonesia), we had the idea that we would like to invite China, and so, this was discussed. Not only China, but also the other countries that were more or less involved in the Cold War. Because we knew that between the Colombo powers at that time, there was the problem of Pakistan and India. Pakistan was a member of a military alliance, while India rejected military alliances – we knew that. When the Bandung Conference was opened, 29 countries were there. So you have endless ranks of the 29 countries.
You have countries who are members of a military alliance, and also countries who are neutral, which means non-aligned. This posed a problem because in one of the resolutions we talked about the right of defence, and it required very tough bargaining to come to a balanced decision, especially in terms of the wording. Later on, the right of self-defence, singly or collectively, was recognized. This had consequences for countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, and other countries who were members of NATO or SEATO. We recognized that they had the right of self-defence collectively, but we would prefer that they had the right of defence individually as well. The verdict on the right defence, singly or collectively, is recognized, but there should be an abstention from the use of military alliances to serve the particular interests of the great powers.
There was a big debate. Nehru, Indonesia, and all the countries who were against the military alliances, said: “Alright, you have the right of self-defence collectively. But you should abstain to use that military alliance for the special interests of big powers.” Pakistan could not say that they were serving the interests of the big power, because Pakistan said “No, if we are a member of SEATO, we are after our own security.” So that was a compromise. And that was one of the delicate problems at the Conference which was solved.
That would also solve the problem of Communism. Because we invited China, and China is Communist. Moreover, China is considered to be an annex of Moscow. In Bandung, there were other opinions, especially from Nehru, but also from Indonesia, and from Zhou Enlai himself. Zhou Enlai said, “Look, we are Communists. I am Communist. But this does not mean that we follow everything that Mao Zedong says.” And that’s how the idea came that Chinese Communism is different from Moscow Communism. So when Sir John Kotelawala presented the idea that there is a new form of colonialism, and the relationship between Moscow and East Europe, we said: “No that is not colonialism, that is up to them.”
Therefore, the meeting about this problem of colonialism, and all its new forms, ended with a compromise. And the compromise was this. We are going say that there was a very antagonistic debate about colonialism in all its forms, because the idea of Sir John Kotelawala was that Communism was colonialism in another form. This was rejected by Zhou Enlai, and also by the other people. No, you cannot say that communism is colonialism. But how could we solve this problem?
We agreed not to mix up the problem, and interfere in the relations between Moscow and the Eastern countries. That was up to them. We don’t want to be mixed up in that. And then, said Zhou Enlai, “If you would like to have colonialism in all its manifestations, then I agree. And he used his hands, like this, showing the Conference. This is colonialism, and its manifestation is in the political field, in the economic field, in the social field, in the ideological field, and so on. But this is manifestation. If you change colonialism in all its manifestations, it is an evil that should be brought to an end. Then I agree.”
So this delicate problem was compromised. Everybody knows that we were treating very delicate problems. That was the success of the Bandung Conference – to eliminate sharp conflicts of ideas, and to come to compromises. This was possible because the rules of procedure made it possible. There are no fixed rules of procedures. It is up to the Chairman to conduct the procedure, the debate, on a very wise way. And that is avoiding floating. How will you come to a decision? By consensus, which is a very interesting problem. I think in Indonesian society, we used four things: discussion (mushawarah), and then we come to mufakat, which means consensus. So if you have two different opinions, you cut off the sharp points of both, and you come to a compromise.
Therefore, the final Communiqué of the Bandung Conference, actually is full of compromises. But without compromises, how can you come to an agreement between twenty-nine countries, which was nearly half of the world, at that time where the United Nations consisted of sixty members. And twenty-nine countries were in Bandung.
AA: Do you think this idea of consensus was Indonesia’s idea? From Indonesian village culture? You also thought this was the most practical way.
RA: We suggested that.
AA: You suggested that? Indonesia suggested?
RA: We know that the other countries, such as the Islamic Arab countries, also agreed that it should come to consensus. Because in the Qu’ranic verse it is said that you should always come to an agreement. Of course you have different opinions, but if you have different opinions, you should try to persuade the other with reasoning, by being very kind, and patient, but also think of the time. That is what the Qu’ran said. You cannot talk for months. So we said: “Of course we should think of the time. And therefore you should come to a consensus because the situation was dangerous at the time. The situation of the Cold War.
The Bandung Conference affected the whole world. From Southeast Asia spreading to the Middle East. That is what I think is the greatest achievement of the Bandung Conference. And the idea that the world is not divided into two blocs. Why should the world be defined by a liberal democracy with capitalism on the one hand, and on the other, an authoritarian Communism with an altruistic ideology. Why should that be the world? No. We said no. There is a Third World.
AA: Can you tell me about the role of China, and especially Prime Minister Zhou Enlai?
RA: It is very interesting, because at first we thought that Zhou Enlai would be a hardliner. Because he was a Communist, and he admitted in his speech that “I am atheist.” We were all frightened, but we didn’t expect his openness. He said: “Why I am an atheist? We, Chinese Communists, respect religion. And we don’t want to have a religion war. And we are not against religion, but religion should be fighting against colonialism. Because religion should be fighting against colonialism, because colonialism is against the religion and against the other communisms. That was revealing of the man. This man is very tolerant. And then he said, “Don’t worry about me. I am an atheist. But that doesn’t mean that I do not recognize, and respect others. In my delegation, there are Muslims. And there were.
This is what we mean by peaceful co-existence. We may differ, but we have a peaceful co-existence. We will not quarrel over this problem, because we are facing colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and so on. This is what Zhou Enlai revealed to us. This actually was not new, because Nehru also had this idea. But this came from the man we thought was a hardliner. And this was revealing.
In his role, he was very, very cooperative. He listened to the speech of Sir John Kotelawala. And then in the mid-afternoon he stopped and said: “Sir John Kotelawala, are you expecting me to fight against you? No!” John was amazed. “Look, I would like to see your text. I will reply tomorrow. But I am not here to quarrel with you. I am here to come to a peaceful settlement of our ideas.” And that is what the whole conference respected, this attitude of Zhou Enlai.
The next morning he made a very short speech. He said, “ I have listened, and I have disagreed, but I have talked to Sir John Kotelawala about it.” And later on, John Kotelawala said that he did not mean Chinese Communism when he spoke.
A very positive role, and very constructive role.
Another thing was that he was adamant. He did not want to recognize Formosa. He is a man of the One-China policy. And he knows the second fleet of the American army is around there. He said, “No, we cannot accept two Chinas.” That is his only stubborn, if I may use the word, attitude.
AA: There was a compromise on the question of military pacts and also on the question of colonialism. Do you think that compromise, that military pacts collectively or singly is OK, but should not be used for the interests of a superpower. That formula, or that compromise, did it have an impact on SEATO later? That it got the Asian countries to think that military alliances are not good.
RA: Of course, we know what will be the attitude of these two big powers. But we said to them that this is our position, if there is a Cold War problem. Because one of the purposes of the Asian-Africa Conference was to feel the professions of Asia and Africa in the World today. That was one of the purposes. We feel our professions in the Cold War. If there is a problem of Cold War in Korea, in Vietnam, in Berlin, our profession is mediation. We try to mediate. We do not use nuclear weapons. We do not use force. If it comes to colonialism, then we fight against it. If America supports colonialism, we will fight America. And if the Soviet Union supports colonialism in Eastern Europe, then we may fight them. But when it comes to the problem of Cold War, we will mediate. That was clear. These two big powers began to think about it.
AA: How about the question of sovereignty, and the principle of non-interference, non-intervention of states? Was there a lot of discussion?
RA: Oh yes. That was also discussed. We rejected any intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. But of course the big problem is economic, because we were all from the Third World. We urged an oil-policy, because we know that we need countries that have oil in Middle East, and here as well. The idea of having an oil-producing organization, like OPEC, was conceived in the Bandung Conference.
AA: Question about Nehru’s role.
RA: Prime Minister Nehru had a very, very leading role. Not only because he has such great charisma, but he is considered the man who is the forerunner of the freedom movement, in India and so on. He mastered the English language, he mastered politics, and he knew all the tactics and strategies of the Great Britain colonial policy. And that is reflected in his ideas when he is talking about this. So his role is a very leading one. That is what I can say. He is a state senior. Of course, he was always criticized by Mohammad Ali. But that does not make any sense, because we know that they were brothers who fought, so we tried to mediate between them.
The problem of the impact of the Bandung Conference, was the non-Aligned Conference. They had a membership that started at 24, later it was 50, showing the relevance of the Bandung Conference. If you ask me whether the ideas at Bandung are still relevant today, mostly they are. But we should also understand the changes of the world. Not all it is still useful. But the basic things, about peaceful co-existence are still valid. Now the people say that the Cold War is over, but there is new war coming. That is the war between the developed countries and the countries that are underdeveloped. This should be bridged. That is why we addressed the debt problem, the problem of technology. The peaceful co-existence idea, I think, is still relevant today.
What we see today, the problem of Zionism against the Arab, Islamic World, and the Third World. Zionism also has its roots in America. It is different from anti-Semitism. If you ask me how to solve this, I believe that you can still use some of the ideas from Bandung.
AA: Did it have an impact on ASEAN. Later on, when Southeast Asian countries led by Indonesia, decided to have their own regional organization, ASEAN. Did Bandung – the process, the principles – have any impact on Indonesia’s involvement in ASEAN?
RA: I think ASEAN has its history. ASEAN has its contribution to the problem of stability in Southeast Asia. But later on, it becomes too limited. So ASEAN must expand its membership, and therefore you now have APEC., the problem of new regional cooperation. I understand that the original ASEAN members would like to keep the ASEAN idea. But you cannot keep it limited.
AA: But what I was asking you also is that ASEAN also operates on the basis of consensus. And ASEAN is also trying to develop, in the 1950s and 60s, a policy of neutralization of Southeast Asia. Do you that some ideas of Bandung had an impact on Indonesian foreign policy, and in the foreign ministry. And when Indonesia became a member of ASEAN, it was trying to make ASEAN in the same mold as the Bandung principles of consensus.
RA: That is true, but it depends on the cabinet in Indonesia, whether it was intensive enough, or just superficial. So we had times were the cabinet in Indonesia was only superficially doing it. But there are times where we are going to be intensive.
Look at the period of Suharto. Suharto is committed to ASEAN. Because ASEAN, at birth, was to keep peace in this area, and not to be a communist organization. But later on, it could not control the influence of China. But China also changed. In the later period, Suharto went to China. Then you have the Habibie period, but it was too short to say what it was. Then came Gus Dur who tried to intensify ASEAN. And now Megawati, I don’t know. The new foreign Minister talks to me as a senior person, and his staff also. I ask him what he is doing: “You cannot keep ASEAN the way that it was. You have to move on. The world is moving, so you need a larger regional cooperation.
In this respect, we were also very clear with Zhou Enlai. Do not interfere anymore. Do not interfere in other states. That is what we told Zhou Enlai. Because colonialism is not only a monopoly of the West, but also exists in the East. He understood. He later on invited me to go to Ulan Baator, in Outer Mongolia.
AA During the Bandung Conference, Nehru said that if you join a military pact, you degrade yourself. The countries that join military alliances are not very sovereign countries. Is there a sense that if countries like Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, and Philippines join military alliances with the US, and use the alliance against other countries in Asia, that means they are not acting as sovereign states?
RA: That’s true, which is why we acted to protect the right of self-defence collectively, that you should abstain from the use of collective military arrangements for the specific interest of the people. Of course, this is just a formulation to caution them. Don’t be used by America as a weapon against other countries. You can see from the “Ten Principles of Bandung” that the right of self-defence singly or collectively is recognized. But you should abstain the use of collective military alliances for the specific interest of the big power.
Hinduism and Buddhism are the so called hydraulic civilizations. They are of the rivers, big rivers. The Rhine is also big, but there are no civilizations.
AA: I think it is interesting to see that you are recognized as one of the key players in the development of non-alignment and Afro-Asian cooperation. And I’m very glad that you are still able to participate in many of these functions. It is a real privilege to meet you.
RA: Professor Amitav, this should give us new inspiration and some confidence that Asia can compete with the rest.
AA: That concludes my interview with Dr. Roeslan Abdulgani, who was, in 1955, the Secretary-General of the Bandung Conference. This is in Jakarta at 11:30 am.
In responding to COVID-19, nations—large and small, democratic and authoritarian—have predictably behaved in similar ways. They have put sovereignty, borders, and their national interests ahead of international cooperation. This phenomenon proved prominent for the United States and China, the two strongest powers, and with small nations, such as Singapore and New Zealand.
Of course, the U.S. and Chinese responses to the pandemic have raised more questions about how the actions of these two countries might affect world order. Contrary to conventional thinking, Chinese and American behavior during the pandemic is not producing a new Cold War or a resurrected liberal international order. Instead, the pandemic is most likely to shift many countries to pursue a different kind of world order—one that reflects multiple centers of authority and capacity in global governance.
The pandemic is most likely to shift many countries to pursue a different kind of world order—one that reflects multiple centers of authority
Different National Responses
The U.S. and Chinese responses to COVID-19 pursued geopolitical goals but with divergent approaches that produced different outcomes. According to Johns Hopkins University, as of July 7, 2021, the United States lost 606,121 lives out of 33,758,758 million cases. China reported 4,848 deaths and 103,948 cases. Even with doubts about its official COVID-19 statistics, China protected its people better than the United States protected the American people. But, for the rest of the world, the more pressing question was whether China, as the country that experienced the first outbreak, and the United States, as a long-standing leader in global health, did enough to protect people in other nations.
The United States and China responded to COVID-19 in very different ways internationally. Under President Donald J. Trump, the United States embraced an “America First” ideology and shunned international cooperation. By contrast, China pursued an activist foreign policy. As President Trump denounced globalization, supply chains, and the World Health Organization (WHO), President Jinping Xi defended globalization and doubled down on Chinese support for, and leadership claims on, global governance. While the United States shopped the world for masks and ventilators, China launched ambitious global mask and vaccine diplomacy efforts.
Similar World Order Implications
Yet, more than a year after WHO declared COVID-19 a pandemic, where is the global standing of these two powers? The pandemic has undercut China’s influence, especially in Asia. This region is critical because it is not only the fastest growing part of the world economically but also the primary geopolitical center of gravity that holds the key to China’s rise as a great power. John Mearsheimer asserted in the Tragedy of Great Power Politics that a regional sphere of influence is a necessary “stepping stone” for rising powers. In the End of American World Order, I argued that the key to a rising power’s global leadership and influence is gaining its own region’s trust rather than securing influence through coercion, as Mearsheimer implied. In Asia, Beijing’s “trust deficit” increased to 63 percent during 2020 compared with 60.4 percent before the pandemic, measured by the percentage of respondents who had “little confidence” and “no confidence” in China doing “the right thing in the interests of the global community.”
The United States and China responded to COVID-19 in very different ways internationally
Nor did China’s successful domestic response establish the supremacy of the “China model” of governance. China is not the only nation to have handled COVID-19 well. Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore also responded effectively, despite different political systems. To be sure, the pandemic response has made Australia look more like China than Great Britain, but China has not made Singapore—itself critical of Western-style, liberal democracy—seethe with jealousy. As Bilahari Kaushikan, a former official of Singapore’s Foreign Ministry, said: “Beijing first bungled by trying to cover up, allowing the virus to take hold in China and rapidly spread beyond its borders. But the draconian measures only a Leninist system is capable of taking brought it under control, albeit at great cost, not all of which was borne by China.”
No matter how strongly China has complained, people around the world continue to associate the origins of COVID-19 with China. International media have highlighted China’s denials, repression of Chinese citizens for their early warnings, and doubts about Beijing’s transparency and cooperation with WHO, which delayed WHO missions to China and undercut the findings of those missions.
In the United States, the Trump administration “chose not to provide leadership during a global crisis,” as Thomas Wright put it, and failed to respond effectively to the pandemic at home. The absurdity of President Trump and his loyalists rejecting mask mandates and social distancing in the name of “freedom” became a caricature of American values before the global audience.
President Biden has made efforts to restore U.S. credibility and influence abroad. The administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance wants the United States to “lead and sustain a stable and open international system” that features “strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, and rules.” Pundits will recognize these objectives as elements of the liberal international order. The United States’ success in developing vaccines, the Biden administration’s impressive domestic vaccine campaign, and the administration’s vaccine-sharing initiatives bolster U.S. efforts to rejuvenate its vision of a liberal international order.
Yet, the toxic partisanship of U.S. domestic politics dampens cheer and hope. Trump’s rejection of the result of the 2020 presidential election, attempts to overturn it through lies and coercion—including the January 6 insurrection—and the prospect of Trump returning to power undermine international respect for the United States. In these circumstances, the Biden administration’s revival of the U.S. commitment to multilateralism and cooperation will not restore a U.S.- or Western-dominated world order. The United States faces a long and daunting challenge in restoring faith in its global leadership.
The Pandemic and the Emerging Multiplex World
In short, COVID-19 makes neither the United States nor China appealing to the rest of the world. A sizeable number of countries could, with good reason, take a Shakespearean “plague on both your houses” approach to world order in the wake of the pandemic. A similar thing happened during the Cold War, when many countries rejected both superpower blocs and worked to create alternative forms and mechanisms of international cooperation. Such a “third way” is possible now.
As I have argued elsewhere, international relations before the pandemic exhibited characteristics of “multiplexity” that neither balance-of-power frameworks (e.g., bipolarity, multipolarity) nor the Western-led liberal international order captured. The emerging “multiplex world” is “not a singular global order, liberal or otherwise, but a complex of crosscutting, if not competing, international orders and globalisms.” In governance terms, a multiplex world is “a G-Plus world, featuring established and emerging powers, global and regional institutions and actors, states, social movements, corporations, private foundations, and various kinds of partnerships among them.”
Rather than locking the world into a new bipolar structure or resurrecting the liberal international order, the pandemic will accelerate the development of this multiplex world. Recovery from the devastation wrought by COVID-19 requires G-Plus governance and cooperation because neither geopolitics nor U.S. global leadership can manage multiplexity effectively. The failures of China and the United States during the pandemic underscore the need to explore and facilitate alternative configurations of governance authority and capacity in the post-pandemic world order. This imperative requires looking past conventional wisdom about the U.S.-China rivalry and the rhetoric about “America is Back” to find new ideas and possibilities, especially those percolating in the Global South.
“Biden can reverse a good deal of the loss of US prestige and influence during the Trump era with renewed commitment to global cooperation and multilateralism, and policies such as ending Trump’s anti-immigration stance, including the travel ban on visitors from several Muslim nations.”
[Washington, DC] There is little question that the Biden administration will focus first and foremost on domestic challenges, especially the economic downturn and the COVID-19 pandemic. But four years of Trump have also severely damaged US standing and credibility globally. In particular, the Trump years severely undercut US credibility and prestige around the world and damaged world order, or what pundits call the liberal international order, which was created and led by the US since World War II.
The Liberal International Order was founded on a combination of globalization, including free trade, and multilateralism. Trump’s 2016 electoral victory was significantly helped by the failure of that order and the US foreign policy that sustained it, to address the concerns of American domestic constituents left behind by free trade. Trump was able to exploit the backlash against globalization which was already brewing in some parts of the US, such as the mid-West, which had suffered job and income losses as factories and companies moved to other nations such as China, where production was cheaper and more efficient. His “America First” and “Make America Great Again” slogans had deep resonance among the rural white lower middle class constituents (including white supremacists), who dislike globalism and have little understanding of the benefits of multilateral institutions. As Covid-19 pandemic hit, Trump condemned global supply chains – a key driver of globalization – as a threat to US national self-reliance on medical products. Trump was able to sell his base constituents the idea that the US had got a “bad deal” from multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organization, which was responsible for promoting global trade and the WHO which favored US competitors such as China at the expense of the US.
Trump’s “America First” policy, disdain for multilateral institutions, disrespect for US allies, and dismissal of democratic values not only weakened the liberal order, but also emboldened the more powerful challengers to that order, such as Russia and China.
Domestically, the Trump regime’s toxic mix of corruption, nepotism, racism, and ineptitude caused a serious erosion of US prestige and credibility around the world. Just look at the US death toll from the COVID-19, which now stands at 400,000. Such a high toll was not inevitable, with proper policies and management. Trump’s incitement of the Capitol insurrection on Jan 6, 2021 has made the US appear unstable and made a mockery of the US democracy and rule of law.
While repairing the damage will not be easy, there are several factors that might now help the Biden administration to stabilize world order and restore America’s global standing.
To begin with, defeat of Trump, the preeminent populist leader of a major nation in modern times, would discourage populist rulers. The fact that Trump not only lost the Presidency and the Senate but also leaving office with a one of the lowest approval ratings ever for a US president, is not a great advertisement for populism.
Biden’s victory should also be a warning to the current populist leaders in Brazil, Philippines, Turkey, Hungary, Israel, Venezuela, Poland and even India. Moreover, while Biden is unlikely to push for democracy promotion abroad, the regime change in Washington would dampen the spirits of the leaders of authoritarian regimes around the world, including North Korea, who got support from Trump. Nor can one expect President Biden encouraging populist policies in democratic nations, as Trump did within the US itself and in the UK, when he embraced Boris Johnson and Brexit.
President Biden brings back a high level of personal decency to the White House. His Vice-President, Kamala Harris, as well as his choice of senior level officials in his administration, symbolize the new administration’s respect for diversity and multiculturalism.
Biden can reverse a good deal of the loss of US prestige and influence during the Trump era with renewed commitment to global cooperation and multilateralism, and policies such as ending Trump’s anti-immigration stance, including the travel ban on visitors from several Muslim nations.
If Biden he succeeds in ensuring economic restoration, then he will steal thee thunder from other powerful nations in the world.
While the US faces major economic and political challenges, so do Russia and China as well as other emerging powers such as Brazil, India and South Africa. By being able to change its government and electing one with such fundamentally different ideology and political approach, the US actually has an advantage over other nations.
The Biden administration would restore the vigour of US alliances and multilateral institutions. Here, the damage inflicted by Trump is not irreversible. Without exception, US allies would welcome renewed US attention and engagement with them. To be sure, thanks to Trump’s affronts, the EU, led by France and Germany, have talked about “European sovereignty”, including greater self-reliance on security. Such talk will not disappear, but the rationale for this will be weaker if US reengages with its European allies through NATO and EU. The EU itself faces multiple challenges which would stifle its search for security self-reliance. It can do with American support.
America’s Indo-Pacific allies, especially Japan, South Korea, Australia remain heavily dependent on US security umbrella and would be relieved if, as likely, the Biden administration, pursues a more positive and respectful relations with them. All indications are that Biden’s foreign policy and security team would pursue a consultative approach towards the US allies, especially when and where their interests and involved.
On the multilateral front, Biden’s policy of returning the to the Paris Climate Agreement and the World Health Organization would be universally welcome. Regional organizations such as ASEAN would also expect a more positive relationship with the US, after the snub of Trump years.
The multilateral system faces a long-term structural crisis caused by financial difficulties, as well as demands for reform to make the UN more democratic and accountable. These problems are beyond the capacity of any single nation to resolve, but having a sympathetic US leadership committed to liberal internationalism helps. Trump rejected globalism in favour of patriotism and nationalism. No leader would reject patriotism, but President Biden is likely to find a way to reconcile nationalism with globalism.
To be sure, the US cannot bring back the golden years of its global primacy. Nor can it restore the liberal international order to its fullest previous extent. The emerging world order is going to be more pluralistic, “multiplex”, or less US- and West-dominated than it has been for the past few centuries. But if Biden can contain the pandemic and stabilize the US economy, while revitalizing US engagement with the world through respect for international norms and global institutions, the US would reemerge as a very respected and influential player in the changing world order.
Jake Sullivan, Distinguished Lecture at School of International Service, American University, Nov 8, 2012
(Summary of key points)
The world is changing. Power shifts, new technologies, and empowered non-state actors are transforming the international arena. And, according to Jake Sullivan, Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. needs to keep up with those changes, while still maintaining the leadership role that has characterized it since World War II.
During a talk organized by the Transnational Challenges and Emerging Nations Dialogue, at the School of International Service on November 8, Sullivan gave his thoughts about the model of foreign policy that Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have implemented. For the past four years, he has travelled to 112 countries with Secretary of State Clinton, and seen “up close and personal” the role of the U.S. in the world.
The Obama model is based on three premises: that the United States still has great convening power, that other countries still look to it for leadership, and that the world is changing.
“The key point is that effective leadership has to look different than it did 20 years ago, because the world looks different,” said Sullivan.
He described four core values that will fulfill the task. The first one is “leadership with purpose.” Sullivan commented that, as in the past, the U.S. needs to work “beyond self interest…driven by the desire to be on the right side of history.” This, according to him, is important in order to counter perceptions created by the most recent wars that the U.S. “is not a friend.”
The second value is “leadership through burden sharing.” The aim is to have mutual responsibility, respect, and dialogue. He mentioned the sanctions imposed by multiple countries on Iran as instructive of how burden can be shared.
Nevertheless, he highlighted the importance of the U.S. in solving such problems. “While it is true that no global challenge can be solved by just any one country, no global challenge can be solved without us.”
The third value is “leadership through enforcement of the rules.”
Professor Amitav Acharya, who is the UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Director of TRANSCEND at SIS, said that the biggest challenge for US foreign policy in the coming decades is how to deal with the rising powers, who want changes in international decision making structures and rules. According to Sullivan, the U.S. has to keep the international order, albeit with adjustments to global changes. Acharya noted that the U.S. needs to be more clear about which rules it wants to be kept and which it won’t mind changed.
Sullivan emphasized that they cannot allow any country “to pick and choose” the rules. However, Acharya argued that “Western countries are as selective as the rising powers. There is no guarantee that the U.S. will play by the rules that it claims to advocate.”
The final value is “leadership by example.” “This means we need to put the house in order,” said Sullivan, referring to building a strong economy and political consensus.
With those guides, Sullivan seemed hopeful about what the United States could do for the rest of the world. “I have become jaded about many things in my job, but one thing I haven’t become jaded about is getting off that plane and thinking of what we can deliver to that country,” he affirmed.
The following is the text of my address to the Fall 2020 Convocation of American University, Washington DC. The speech was live online on Aug 21, 2020 at 1pm. The address is traditionally given by the winner of American University’s highest honor: the Scholar-Teacher Award. The address included images of the Acharya in Robben Island prison (where Mandela was held), President Kennedy’s Conmencement Address to American University in 1963, and images of Mandela’s biography and Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s autobiography.
Hello the newest members of the AU community. Greetings.
I am the child of a pandemic. My father was born in a small village in India in 1915. Those days, India, like many other poor parts of the world, was plagued by killer infectious diseases, including small pox.
My father was a small pox survivor who bore its scars on his face for his entire adult life. And he lost not one, not two, but six siblings to small pox.
But my father persevered. He went on to become the first person from our village to earn a university degree. In fact he got two: in Arts and in Education. He built a very successful life as a High School headmaster. It was because of my father that I chose an academic career.
Today, you are embarking on the most important journey of your life in the most challenging of times.
Never before in history have so many students the world over begun a new academic year entirely on-line.
Yet, these unprecedented times are also a huge opportunity to prove ourselves.
Your success at AU will both reassure and inspire the world’s present and future generations.
Through my life’s experience, I recognize diversity and inclusion when I see it.
You will not be alone. We the faculty and administrators of AU will be there with you every step of your journey with us.
Among AU’s most cherished qualities is our commitment to diversity, excellence and inclusion. I have no doubt about it.
The first American whom I remember is President John F. Kennedy. Not that I meet him. I was only one year old when Kennedy was assassinated. But I remember him vividly because there was a framed picture of him and the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in our home.
In 1961, a year before I was born, Nehru visited Kennedy in the US.
The two had much in common. Kennedy was the leader of the world’s most powerful democracy. Nehru was the leader of the world’s largest democracy.
Both were staunch liberal internationalists, passionately committed to promoting diversity and cooperation in the world.
My father was a huge fan of both leaders. He clipped and framed a news-magazine cover of Kennedy and Nehru taking a stroll in the White House lawns. You can find that picture on the internet.
That picture was my first impression of what an American looks like.
That picture first inspired me to study and teach international affairs.
And that American, President John F. Kennedy, is a big part of American University. It was on this very campus that President Kennedy gave the Commencement Address to the graduating class of 1963.
There Kennedy said, and I quote:
“If we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity.”
The outdoor podium from which Kennedy spoke is still there. I urge you to visit it when you are next in campus, I hope very soon.
Three decades after Kennedy’s AU speech, another great leader of the 20th century, another of my personal heroes, invoked Kennedy’s words. His name is Nelson Mandela.
In an article published in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1993, Mandela wrote that he would strive, and I quote,
“To promote institutions and forces that, through democratic means, seek to make the world safe for diversity.”
Thus Mandela wrote the very words that Kennedy had uttered on this very campus. I repeat:
“To make the world safe for diversity”.
In 2011, I had the privilege of being appointed as the Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of International Relations at Rhodes University, South Africa. Rhodes is located in South Africa’s Eastern Cape province, where Mandela was born. Visiting Mandela’s birthplace as well as the Robben Island prison where he was imprisoned for 27 years, are among the most moving experiences of my life.
Even though I am no politician, the words and actions of John F. Kennedy, Jawaharlal Nehru and Nelson Mandela have profoundly shaped my own academic leadership.
My best opportunity to do so came in 2014. That year I became the first non-white person to be elected as President of the International Studies Association. This is the world’s largest and most respected association for faculty and students in International Studies. In my Presidential Speech, I put the pictures and quotes of Kennedy and Mandela on a single slide on the screen, along with their immortal words.
And there I urged the academic community to make the study and practice of international affairs “safe for diversity”.
These words apply to every field of study…in the natural sciences, the social sciences, the humanities and beyond.
Today, as we cope with a deadly pandemic, it is equally vital that we strive to respect our diversity and promote inclusion.
And there can be no better place to do so than our very institution, American University.
As scholars and citizens of the world, each of us should persevere, as did Kennedy, Nehru and Mandela – and as did my father in his own time and way – to make our world safer for diversity.
Governments that endured the SARS pandemic in 2003 were generally more prepared for Covid-19. Such pandemics emerge with little warning, challenging a global multilateral system largely structured around collective security and trade. Both diseases – linked with globalization, a complex phenomenon not easily reversed – offer lessons for global governance, signaling the need for adaptation and cooperation. “In recent years an array of emerging actors in a range of areas, including trade arrangements, climate change, humanitarian relief and health have contributed to growing fragmentation of global governance,” explains Amitav Acharya, distinguished professor of international relations at American University. The United States and China as leading powers each had missteps – the former abandoning global leadership and the second delaying global reporting. Angry exchanges of blame overshadow legitimate concerns expressed by each country. “The bottom line is that both the United States and China find the other’s conduct irresponsible and dangerous even as the world needs a norm of ‘responsibility to inform,’ as much as a ‘responsibility to protect,’” Acharya writes. He urges cooperation on global governance reforms to prepare for the new range of threats and, especially, a requirement for swift reporting of new and deadly diseases. – YaleGlobal
Irresponsible Superpowers Must Cooperate
Covid-19 response reveals that global powers and multilateral organizations need to improve their game on reforms, fact-finding, funding and more
Tuesday, May 5, 2020
WHO is responsible for the delay? Director-General of WHO Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on January 28, but the joint fact-finding mission did not start its investigation until February 16; the world expressed amazement after the country imposed a lockdown for the city of Wuhan in January
WASHINGTON, DC: In the Covid-19 pandemic, neither China nor the United States has offered a creditable performance, and this puts immense pressure on the multilateral system.
Most countries escaped SARS-CoV-1 in 2003. The virus hit 26 countries and only eight Americans tested positive for SARS, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The United States and many other nations were not prepared 15 years later when a new coronavirus emerged, much more threatening to lives and well-being. The SARS-CoV-1 virus infected just over 8,000 people worldwide and left 774 dead. By comparison, with SARS-CoV-2, nations report more than 3.1 million confirmed cases, with 225,000 deaths. As I wrote in 2003, such perils, rooted in globalization, cannot be defeated permanently.
Of course, pandemics are not the only threat confronting the world. But unlike armed conflicts where early warning is available, or climate change, which threatens lives in a slow motion, pandemics emerge unexpectedly. And that is a severe challenge for the global multilateral system, in place since World War II. That system was built around big multilaterals of the UN system, such as the International Monetary Fund; the World Bank; the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, later the World Trade Organization; along with specialized agencies like the World Health Organization, founded in 1948. Despite many agencies and tasks, the system was fundamentally geared for collective security, the foundational principle of the UN system, deterring and defeating aggression. The system must adapt to newer threats that can be far more deadly than war.
In recent years an array of emerging actors in a range of areas, including trade arrangements, climate change, humanitarian relief and health have contributed to growing fragmentation of global governance. But none compares with Donald Trump, whose disdain for multilateralism is visceral. Under Trump, the United States abandoned responsibility to lead common responses to common challenges, whether on its own or through alliances and institutions.
Before the virus hit, the Trump administration proposed cutting $3 billion in global health funding, including $123 million for the World Health Organization for fiscal year 2020. At an 8 April White House briefing, Trump warned that the United States would “put a very powerful hold” on WHO funding and criticized the Covid-19 response: “They missed the call…They seem to be very China-centric.”
By rejecting travel restrictions, initially accepting China’s early denial of human-to-human transmission, and not declaring Covid-19 a global pandemic until March 11 – after 118,000 cases of infection in more than 110 countries – the WHO leaves itself open to criticism and investigations. Early warnings and fact-finding missions are critical in pandemics.
China remains a much stronger supporter of the existing multilateral system, at least in theory. But China has also moved to create parallel mechanisms like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative. The country, which has provided considerable bilateral aid to virus-stricken nations, first reported the coronavirus outbreak to WHO on 31 December. The WHO-China Joint Mission did not start until 16 February. It is fair to question whether an earlier mission might have provided timely information, prompting more action from the international community. According to a New York Times report, China held back on allowing a WHO mission, with sources blaming secretiveness, negligence, complacency and even a desire among Chinese scientists to produce the first publications on the new virus. WHO could have raised international attention, applying pressure for an earlier mission.
China also condemned Trump’s actions, such as ban on flights from China, as “excessive,” an example of how America “unceasingly manufactured and spread panic.” Yet the United States was not alone in banning flights, and Trump soon did the same for other nations. And the caution was warranted.
An angry Trump has suggested that if China was knowingly responsible, there “should be consequences.” The United States, the leading donor for WHO, is investigating whether the virus originated from a research laboratory in China, even though the organization suggests that no evidence suggests as much. Convincing proof is unlikely.
Still, any attempt by the United States to enter a confrontation with China would further destabilize the multilateral system, including global health cooperation. More US funding for global health would go to national and bilateral channels, or supporting a smaller health agency that might exclude China and other rivals.
The theatrics may have overshadowed efforts by others in the Trump administration to raise genuine concerns about China’s responsibility for transparency during the early stages of the crisis. As underscored by Deborah Birx, coordinator of the White House coronavirus task force, any country first exposed to a pandemic, has “a higher moral obligation on communicating and transparency.” Whether China met that transparency test, she added, could be investigated once the pandemic subsides. China would likely resist any such multilateral investigation into its domestic affairs. Still, other nations could develop a framework, as she advises, and “figure out really what has to happen for first alerts and transparency and understanding very early on.”
The bottom line is that both the United States and China find the other’s conduct irresponsible and dangerous even as the world needs a norm of “responsibility to inform,” as much as a “responsibility to protect.”
The multilateral system cannot address transnational threats like Covid-19 on its own. Such threats are linked to globalization, which cannot be entirely reversed. Pandemics emerged and spread during the Mongol Empire’s much smaller scale of globalization during the 14th century. That plague probably emerged in China before killing half of Europe’s population, then spreading on to India, Africa and the Middle East – eventually reducing the global population by almost 100 million.
As I wrote of the 2003 SARS crisis, the origins of pandemics cannot be regarded as exclusively external or internal to the region: “Rather, they emanate from external forces interacting closely with the internal vulnerabilities of states.” Hence, reducing internal vulnerabilities is a crucial first step.
Countries and territories that have done the early creditable work in containing Covid-19 were those that invested well in public health and early alert systems, after being devastated by SARS: Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore – the latter experiencing a spike in new cases, mostly among migrant workers.
At the same time, highly exclusionary and inward-looking responses will not work in the long term and could impose severe economic costs. Closing national boundaries, as many nations have done, can only be a temporary measure. It’s noteworthy that SARS 2003 did not lead to such closures, mainly because of the disease’s lower transmissibility and absence of asymptomatic transmission, but also because the world was operating under a climate of trust and coordination with fewer populists.
Hence, old attitudes towards sovereignty and non-interference that prevent fact-finding and international monitoring must change, especially in countries like China that aspire to be leaders in global governance.
The multilateral system can also do better. For example, giving WHO more funding is not enough. Stronger mandates are also required. Instead of cutting funding and emasculating the organization, the United States and other nations should push for the UN Security Council to require mandatory reporting and allow WHO fact-finding missions within days of a major outbreak. National reporting on terrorism to the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, now mandatory, could provide a model for pandemic preparations, with a shorter and incident-based reporting period.
The failure by any state to report outbreaks promptly and allow international fact-finding missions should be the equivalent of aggression. Most nations should readily agree after so many have endured thousands of human lives lost and trillions in economic losses.
Amitav Acharya is Distinguished Professor of International Relations, American University, Washington DC, and a 2019-20 fellow of the Berggruen Institute in California. He is the author of The Making of Global International Relations (Cambridge 2019); Constructing Global Order (Cambridge 2018); and The End of American World Order, 2nd edition (Polity 2018).
According to a New York Times report, China held back on allowing a WHO mission. Why? The reasons are explored in the article: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/health/cdc-coronavirus-china.html. Some have blamed it on the political system’s usual secretiveness and lack of transparency, negligence, complacency, scientific competition (desire among Chinese scientists to get the first publications on the new virus out),
Instead of cutting funding and fatally emasculating the WHO, the US and other nations should push for the UN Security Council to make it mandatory for states to report & allow WHO fact-finding within days of a major disease outbreak. It should treat failure by a state to report outbreaks promptly & allow WHO fact-finding missions equivalent of aggression
Terrorism reporting is now mandatory. The United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) can be a model, but shorter & incident-based reporting period for disease necessary.
An interview with Professor Amitav Acharya, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor at the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC.
Existing debates in International Relations (IR) and global governance are still Western-dominated, neglecting non-Western voices, experiences and agency. Do you think this is changing? Where do you see the biggest challenges?
I think there is growing awareness of Western dominance in IR and global governance, both in the West and in the non-West, but this is not translating into sufficient action. Importantly, not everybody in the West wants to level the playing field. Indeed, some scholars have argued that American or Western dominance is beneficial to the field and not actually excluding or discriminating against anyone. Professor John Mearsheimer, for example, has called it a ‘benign hegemony’. I completely disagree with this view because there is a lot of gatekeeping going on and that is both a normative and an intellectual problem.
There are some interesting surveys that illustrate this gap between awareness and action. For example, a 2014 TRIP (Teaching, Research and International Policy) survey found that over 70% of respondents, which included mainly Western scholars, agreed that IR is a Western-centric discipline.* So, awareness is high. But when you ask the same people whether this is something that should be addressed, numbers are much lower, in particular among American scholars.
This is very disturbing because it undermines efforts to promote greater diversity. Diversity has become a priority concern for universities, journals and academic associations but this commitment is often very superficial and there is little progress when it comes to making real changes: reforming PhD programmes and training more Global South scholars, hiring more faculty from the Global South, changing text books, course offerings and literature lists, providing more citations to Global South scholars, accepting more journal submissions from the Global South, pluralising membership in academic committees, inviting more speakers from the Global South, etc.
There has been a similar debate on the barriers facing women in the field.
Yes, and a lot more needs to be done in this area, too. However, the debate on gender equality has advanced much more. For example, it is now fairly difficult to have a so-called ‘manel’ (a man-only panel) without attracting criticism, but panels without Global South representation are still very common – and this is no longer because of a lack of qualified speakers. And, of course, getting recognition for their work is especially difficult for women from the Global South. Many of them feel that mainstream feminist IR scholarship is exclusive and does not reflect their voices.
A point I would really like to emphasise here is that diversity is not just a normative concern but also a practical and an intellectual one. This is not just about getting more people to the table but also about getting new ideas on the table. In IR and global governance, many of the existing theories simply do not capture what’s happening in the world because they are derived from a very Eurocentric template. For instance, we talk about multilateralism as if it started with the 19th century Concert of Europe. Examples of multilateral practices outside the West are being routinely overlooked, although there are many, from the diplomatic practices of earlier civilizations such as Egypt and Mesopotamia to the post-World War II Asia-African Conference.
Similarly, dominant theories of regional integration have failed to take into account the history and culture of local communities. Consider, for example, the idea that the European Union (EU) should serve as a model for the rest of the world, which was especially prominent during the 1990s and 2000s. The EU’s efforts to promote its own model never worked elsewhere, even where other regions wanted to replicate it and where they were supported with finance and know-how. The model was simply too formulaic and the theories behind it did not consider local context.
So that is why diversity and inclusion is not just a normative imperative but also an analytical and intellectual concern. The rest of the world is much bigger than Europe – both in terms of physical size and population and in terms of history and cultural heritage. If we do not bring the ‘rest’ in, our theories will fall short and lack explanatory power.
Let’s talk about your book The End of American World Order. The first edition was published in 2014 and it documented the crisis of the US-led global liberal order, even before President Trump came into power (an updated and extended edition has been published in 2018). You also reflect on what will replace the current world order, suggesting that we are currently witnessing the emergence of a ‘multiplex’ world. How did you come up with this term and what does it entail?
The main reason why I introduced the concept of multiplex is because I did not like the term multipolar. Multipolarity is the conventional way of describing a world order that is neither bi-polar nor unipolar. But it is an outdated concept and it refers back to a very particular (pre-World War II) period in European history which is unlikely to repeat itself in the same way. I wanted to move away from this Eurocentric perspective, the sense of inevitable conflict and the idea of ‘going back to the future’.
I also felt that multiplex conveys the notions of both multiplicity and complexity. Multiplicity refers to the growing number and diversity of actors involved in making the global order, including not just states but also international institutions, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, transnational movements, individuals and other non-state actors. Complexity refers to the growing number of transboundary issues, many of which are not completely new but have become more prominent and more urgent. These issues are complex in the sense that they are multidimensional, often unpredictable (think about the 1997 and 2008 financial crises, for example, or the Ebola outbreak), and impossible to be addressed on the national level alone.
In the book, I also use a metaphor from the world of cinema and film. I suggest that the world will be like a multiplex theatre where the audience has the option of choosing between many different movies, actors, directors, producers and plots. In the 1950s, your local cinema would only show one movie at a time. Nowadays, we have far more choice and we do not even need a physical cinema anymore, we can carry our Netflix with us wherever we go. Cinematic entertainment is much more democratic and demand-driven. Today’s world order is somewhat similar. In a multiplex world, we have the choice between different narratives. There is the traditional narrative – the ‘Hollywood plot’ so to speak – about how the liberal world order was created almost single-handedly by the US. But there are also different narratives about how other countries and regions all played an important role in the making of world order. So the notion of multiplex allows us to pluralise plots, actors, directors and producers. And while producers can create demand to a degree, most of the time they will cater to the changing taste of the audience.
So, we are making the transition from a hegemonic world to a much more pluralistic and decentred world. A multiplex world is politically and culturally diverse but economically and functionally interconnected. Order is produced not just by a handful of great powers but by a multitude of actors, including established powers, emerging powers and non-state actors, who can use both material and ideational resources. This is a world which is quite different from the world of Western dominance we have experienced for the past 200 (we might even say 500) years, so it indicates a significant transformation of the world.
How do you think multiplexity will affect discussions on the legitimacy of global governance?
That is a very fundamental question. In global governance there has always been a concern over what I would call the legitimacy-efficacy paradox. Traditionally, it has been thought that if you have more legitimacy – more representation, diversity and inclusion – you risk undermining efficacy because the group of actors involved becomes too big, making it difficult to reach any kind of consensus. On the other hand, if you have only a small group of actors, as in the G-7/8 model, the outcome might not be acceptable to those who were not involved in the decision-making process. Today, effective responses to global challenges are needed more than ever but you can no longer have a bunch of Western countries basically take all the decisions. Whether the issue is human rights, peace and security, finance or trade – solutions in all these areas will only be acceptable if they are being made with the participation of Global South countries.
So a multiplex world brings these tensions to the fore. However, having worked on different projects on global governance and world order over the past years**, I am now more and more convinced that legitimacy is key to efficacy. The two are not mutually exclusive unless you take a very narrow, utilitarian view of efficacy. I believe that efficacy refers to something that works not just for a few major players, something that does not encounter too much resistance. I also think that new ideas and perspectives are important to ensure efficacy, so consulting with a wider range of actors is likely to lead to better and more sustainable solutions.
A multiplex world is a G-Plus world, where leadership is shared and exercised by different groups of actors in different issue areas, depending on interests, expertise and capabilities. No country or bloc leads in every issue area. I think it is possible to create smaller groups that are legitimate – in that they represents a significant swath of humanity – and that still deliver efficacy. In my view, a good (though not perfect) example is G-20. G20 is very different from G-7/8; it has significant representation from the Global South and it is the first international institution where the Global South and the Global North interact as equals. G-20 was in fact quite effective in addressing the 2008 global financial crisis. It is by no means a perfect model and there are important concerns about representation – for example, Africa has only one seat in the G-20 – but it is much more legitimate than G-7/8 and is also more efficient when it comes to responding to financial crises. That said, G-20 does not fit the G-Plus model perfectly because it is still very state-centric. We now see new types of collaboration emerging in fields such as climate change and global health that involve not just states but also a range of non-state actors. These types of collaborations may have the potential of increasing both legitimacy and efficacy.
The debate on the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other rising powers has long focused on whether they are status quo powers that can be ‘co-opted’ into the existing liberal international order or revisionist powers that challenge the system as a whole – but you take a much more nuanced view. How do you see the role of the emerging powers in a multiplex world?
My approach has always been to avoid such binaries. First of all, I do not think emerging powers can be co-opted. Co-option as an idea was devised by proponents not just of liberal order but of liberal hegemony. The assumption basically was that China, India and other rising powers would support the US-led liberal order because they had benefitted so much from it. But the world does not work like that. It is politically not realistic to think that the new powers will simply accept everything the established group of powers have decided. And it is also institutionally impossible. The existing global institutions will have to change to accommodate new actors and new power constellations. The notion of co-option undercuts any idea of negotiation, change and concessions.
At the same time, I do not think the rising powers have the capacity or the unity to run the world on their own. The BRICS are a very diverse group of countries both in terms of political systems and economic development and there is also rivalry between some of the rising powers (e.g. between China and India). In addition, many BRICS countries and other regional powers such as Nigeria or Egypt do not have undisputed regional legitimacy and they are often tied up in regional rivalry and conflict. Countries such as China and India, for example, spend a lot of time looking after their neighbourhood and that takes resources and attention away from the global stage.
So we have a situation where neither the West nor the emerging powers can run lead the world on their own. They have to accommodate each other. The emerging powers cannot challenge the existing world order and multilateral system as a whole but they can disrupt and reshape. And the West cannot ignore, exclude or co-opt the emerging powers but it can negotiate space with them. I think this realisation has begun to sink in and it was reflected, for example, in the negotiation of the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement where China, India and others played an important role. The election of Donald Trump may have disrupted this process but I believe sooner or later the West and the ‘rest’ will have to come to an understanding – a multiplex understanding – that neither can do without the other. This will put an end both to the hype surrounding the emerging powers and to any fantasies that the US will be able to revive the liberal hegemony.
To new students of global governance today’s world may appear extremely complex, confusing and sometimes frightening. Do you have any advice?
Well, first of all, I do not think today’s world is really frightening. It is challenging, yes, but it is also very exciting. There are so many things happening and so many new areas of research. In the old days, if you studied global governance you might have been bored to death studying UN Security Council voting or something similar. Now you can do global governance and go to a village in India and look at how international donors, non-state actors and the local municipal government collaborate to address climate change, asking questions such as: what global implications does this local partnership have? Can it be replicated elsewhere? So this is now a fantastically rich field of study.
Of course, there are concerns about peace and security, pandemics and other issues but most of these are not new. I do not think the world is less safe than before, in fact, broadly speaking it has probably become more secure in some areas. So, I think the overall message is positive, or at least mixed. For those teaching global governance, I believe curriculum planning is very important: rather than exclusively focusing on traditional theories, we should make sure that students are also exposed to new and emerging ideas, themes and literature. From my own teaching, I know that the idea of a multiplex world is very exciting for students from both the non-West and the West, because they see new possibilities for themselves and opportunities to make a difference.
So if I were to give a sort of motivational talk to new entrants to the field of global order and governance, this is what I would tell the students: there are more themes and more topics to explore, more opportunities, and more possibilities for building new theories and concepts. It is a very exciting time for anyone studying global governance or IR more broadly.
* For a discussion, see, Amitav Acharya, “Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions and Contributions,” International Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 2016): 4-15.
** These projects have resulted in three books: The End of the American World Order (Polity, 2014; 2018), Why Govern? Rethinking Demand and Progress in Global Governance(edited, Cambridge University Press, 2016) and Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
In June 2019, the UCL Global Governance Institute (GGI) hosted Professor Acharya as a Senior Visiting Fellow. This interview was conducted by Julia Kreienkamp (GGI Research Assistant) during his stay.
Amitav Acharya is the UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor at the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC. His recent books include The End of American World Order (Polity, 2014, 2018); Constructing Global Order (Cambridge, 2018); Why Govern: rethinking Demand and Progress in Global Governance (editor, Cambridge, 2016); and The Making of Global International Relations: Origins and Evolution of IR at Its Centenary (co-author with Barry Buzan, Cambridge, 2019). His articles have appeared in International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, International Affairs, Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, and World Politics. He has contributed op-eds to Financial Times, Washington Post (Monkey Cage Blog), International Herald Tribune/New York Times, Times of India, Australian Financial Review, and YaleGlobal Online, and appeared in BBC, CNN, CNBC, and National Public Radio (NPR) and other media. He was appointed to be the inaugural Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor of International Relations at Rhodes University, South Africa during 2012-13 and the inaugural Boeing Company Chair in International Relations at the Schwarzman Scholars Program at Tsinghua University during 2016-18. He has held fellowships at Harvard’s Asia Center and John F. Kennedy School of Government during 1999-2001, and was elected to the Christensen Fellowship at Oxford in 2013. He is the first non-Western scholar elected to lead the International Studies Association (ISA), the world’s largest and most influential association on international studies. ISA has honored him with two Distinguished Scholar Awards: in 2015 for his “outstanding contribution to scholarship on non-Western IR theory and inclusion in IR” and another in 2018 for “exceptional… influence, intellectual works and mentorship” in the field of international organization.